Choosing Algorithms

limited. In typical applications of cryptography, public-key operations are employed in combination with other techniques. In particular, public-key operations often represent only a minor overhead in the total processing, whether in storage or in computation time. A “faster” or “smaller” public-key technique thus may have little overall impact in many applications.

Elliptic curve cryptosystems have, at this point, relatively fewer cryptanalytic results than established systems. It could be that the systems are stronger, or it could be that they are just not that well understood. In either case, this is an observation that calls for further study.

In conclusion, RSA Security is currently recommending that elliptic curve cryptosystems continue to be studied as additional tools in the public-key repertoire, and that they be considered as near-term solutions in the particular cases where the alternative would be to have no security at all.

For more information about elliptic curve cryptosystems, see the RSA Laboratories technical note, Recommendations on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems, at http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/technotes/.

Interoperability

Elliptic curve public-key methods can be constructed in a number of ways. Parameters can be chosen over odd prime fields or fields of even characteristic. The underlying mathematics of these implementations is different enough that a successful implementation of only one of these approaches could not handle another implementation. In essence, this means that one could build two different cryptosystems, both using elliptic curve cryptography, but unable to interoperate with each other.

The two main interoperability issues for elliptic curve cryptosystems are the choice of finite field over which the elliptic curve is defined and the representation of elements in the finite field.

There are two types of finite fields: finite fields with p elements, where p is an odd prime, denoted Fp, and called “odd prime fields”, and a finite field with 2m elements for some integer m, denoted Fm, and called “even characteristic.” It is not possible to convert between the two types of finite field, so the choice of finite field is critical to interoperability.

The even characteristic implementations offer greater gains in hardware implementation. However, the odd prime implementations can use the same special- purpose circuitry that is available for implementations such as RSA encryption. This can make the odd characteristic a better choice for situations where RSA hardware is

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RSA Security 5.2.2 manual Interoperability