Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual TOE Boundaries and Scope, Physical Boundary

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Security Target, Version 3.9

March 18, 2008

 

 

Configuration of the TOE is performed via a Command Line Interface (CLI) by physically connecting a device (such as a laptop) to the serial interface of the TOE and utilizing dumb-terminal software. After the TOE is configured, it can be managed remotely via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) which is accessed by a management workstation connected to the protected and trusted internal network.

2.3 TOE Boundaries and Scope

This section identifies the physical and logical components of the TOE that are included in this evaluation.

2.3.1 Physical Boundary

Figure 3 and Figure 4 below illustrates the physical boundary of this CC evaluation:

Legend:

TOE Boundary

The World

 

Enterprise

 

VPN Tunnel

Corporate

 

 

 

Internet

Network

 

 

Nortel

Nortel VPN Router

 

VPN Client

 

 

 

Workstation

 

 

 

 

Corporate

 

 

Servers

 

CLI Workstation

Management

 

 

Workstation

Figure 3 - Physical TOE Boundary

Figure 4 - Physical TOE Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

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© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Revision History Version Modification Date Modified By Description of ChangesTable of Contents Protection Profile Claims Table of FiguresTable of Tables RationaleSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance Security Target IntroductionPurpose ST, TOE, and CC Identification and ConformanceTerminology Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyConventions TerminologyPrimary Admin password Product Type TOE DescriptionProduct Description Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE TOE Boundaries and Scope Physical BoundaryLogical Boundary TOE EnvironmentWorld EnterpriseCryptographic Support Security AuditUser Data Protection Protection of the TOE Security Functions Identification and AuthenticationSecurity Management Trusted Path/ChannelsExcluded TOE Functionality Assumptions TOE Security EnvironmentThreats to Security Threats Addressed by the TOE Threats Addressed by the TOE EnvironmentSecurity Objectives Security Objectives for the TOENon-IT Security Objectives Security Objectives for the EnvironmentIT Security Objectives OE.TIMETOE Security Functional Requirements IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST OperationDescription ST Operation FAUSAR.1 Audit review Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing Security Target, Version March 18 Class FDP User Data Protection FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPNFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUCT.1.1 FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUIT.1.1FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionDependencies No dependencies FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.2.1FMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesFMTSMR.1.2 Class FPT Protection of the TSF FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTRPL.1 Replay detectionFTPTRP.1.1 Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1 Trusted path FTPTRP.1.2FPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Components Assurance RequirementsAssurance Requirements TOE Security TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Functions Description FunctionAccounting Logs Configuration LogSecurity Audit Security LogSystem Log Event LogFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Cryptographic SupportFips Validated Modules Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate #User Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security ManagementProtection of the TOE Security Functions Power-Up Self-TestsConditional Self-Tests TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTrusted Path/Channels Assurance Assurance Measure ComponentAugmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Claims Protection Profile ReferenceRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives RationaleSecurity Objectives Rationale TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-ITHack Certificate Security Functional Requirements Rationale OE.CERTIFICATERelationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Objectives RequirementsFunctions and data EnvAble to access such functionality FMTMSA.3a,b,cReject packets based on their attributes IntegrityDependency Rationale Security Assurance Requirements RationaleRationale for Strength of Function Functional Requirements DependenciesFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Secure Delivery and Operation Configuration ManagementDevelopment Life Cycle Support Documents Guidance DocumentationTests Strength of Function Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function AnalysesAcronym Definition AcronymsAcronyms DoDSHA
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