Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual System Log, Event Log

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Security Target, Version 3.9March 18, 2008

System Log

The System Log records data about System events which are considered significant enough

 

to be written to disk, including those displayed in the Configuration and Security logs.

 

Examples of events that would appear in the System log include:

 

LDAP activity

 

Configuration activity

 

Server authentication and authorization requests

 

The following list gives the general format of System Log entries:

 

Time stamp

 

Task that issued the event (“tEvtLgMgr”, “tObjMgr”, “tHttpdTask”)

 

A number that indicates the Central Processing Unit (CPU) that issued the event

 

(“0” = “CPU(0)”, “1” = “CPU(1)”)

 

Software module that issued the event

 

A number that indicates the event’s persistence (“0” = “non-persistent”, “1” =

 

“persistent”)

 

A number that indicates the event’s severity level (“0” = “Debug”, “1” = “Low”,

 

“2” = “Medium”, “3” = “High”)

 

Rule section matched by this event

 

Matching packet source, destination, protocol, and action configured for the

 

matched rule

Event Log

The Event Log records detailed data about all events that take place on the system. These

 

entries are not necessarily written to disk (as with the System Log). The Event Log records

 

data about all system activity in-memory, but only the significant entries are saved in the

 

System Log (i.e., on disk).

 

The Event Log includes information on tunneling, security, backups, debugging, hardware,

 

security, daemon processes, software drivers, interface card driver events, and other system

 

components and event types.

 

The Event Log retains the most recent 2000 log entries. Once this maximum capacity has

 

been reached the Event Log overwrites the oldest entry when a new entry needs to be made.

TOE administrators interact with the TOE through the management GUI [or CLI], but unprivileged TOE users are restricted to establishing VPN sessions with the TOE via the Nortel VPN Client. All of the user actions (detailed above) performed through either of these interfaces are recorded in the appropriate audit log. The TOE creates an audit record when a TOE user causes any of the events in “Table 4 - Auditable Events” to occur. Audit records generated in the Nortel VPN Router are stored locally as flat files on internal storage with no direct TOE administrator access.

Since audit functionality is critical to the secure operation of the TOE, both internal and external backups of the audit logs are supported. Automatic backup and archiving of the logs ensures that the logs are always available. External storage backup of audit records occurs outside of the TOE and it is the administrator’s responsibility to specify an external backup server.

TOE administrators may view audit records via a management GUI display (in a manner suitable for human consumption and understanding). This display includes the date and time of the event; the type of event; the subject identity; the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and the identity of the user responsible for the event. TOE users can read audit records only through the TOE’s management GUI, and only after being authenticated to an appropriately privileged role. TOE users are never given write access to the audit records.

TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAR.1.

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

Page 44 of 67

© 2008 Nortel Networks

 

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Revision History Version Modification Date Modified By Description of ChangesTable of Contents Table of Figures Table of TablesProtection Profile Claims RationaleSecurity Target Introduction PurposeSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance ST, TOE, and CC Identification and ConformanceConventions, Acronyms, and Terminology ConventionsTerminology TerminologyPrimary Admin password Product Description TOE DescriptionProduct Type Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE TOE Boundaries and Scope Physical BoundaryLogical Boundary TOE EnvironmentWorld EnterpriseUser Data Protection Security AuditCryptographic Support Identification and Authentication Security ManagementProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/ChannelsExcluded TOE Functionality Threats to Security TOE Security EnvironmentAssumptions Threats Addressed by the TOE Threats Addressed by the TOE EnvironmentSecurity Objectives Security Objectives for the TOESecurity Objectives for the Environment IT Security ObjectivesNon-IT Security Objectives OE.TIMEIT Security Requirements TOE Security Functional RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST OperationDescription ST Operation Class FAU Security Audit FAUGEN.1 Audit Data GenerationFAUSAR.1 Audit review Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation Class FCS Cryptographic Support FCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-HellmanFCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation Security Target, Version March 18 FDPACC.2 Complete access control FDPACF.1 Security attribute based access controlClass FDP User Data Protection FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPNFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrityFDPUCT.1.1 FDPUIT.1.1Class FIA Identification and Authentication FIAUAU.1 Timing of authenticationFIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionDependencies No dependencies Class FMT Security Management FMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviourFMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.1c Management of security attributes FMTMSA.2 Secure security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.2.1FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisationFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesFMTSMR.1.2 FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testing FPTTST.1 TSF testingClass FPT Protection of the TSF FPTRPL.1 Replay detectionClass FTP Trusted Path/Channels FTPTRP.1 Trusted pathFTPTRP.1.1 FTPTRP.1.2Security Functional Requirements on the IT Environment FPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSPFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance Requirements Assurance Components TOE Summary Specification TOE Security FunctionsTOE Security Description FunctionConfiguration Log Security AuditAccounting Logs Security LogSystem Log Event LogCryptographic Support Fips Validated ModulesFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate #User Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security ManagementConditional Self-Tests Power-Up Self-TestsProtection of the TOE Security Functions TOE Security Assurance Measures Trusted Path/ChannelsTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Assurance Assurance Measure ComponentAugmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Claims Protection Profile ReferenceRationale Security Objectives RationaleRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-ITHack Certificate Security Functional Requirements Rationale OE.CERTIFICATERelationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Objectives RequirementsFunctions and data EnvAble to access such functionality FMTMSA.3a,b,cReject packets based on their attributes IntegritySecurity Assurance Requirements Rationale Rationale for Strength of FunctionDependency Rationale Functional Requirements DependenciesFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Development Configuration ManagementSecure Delivery and Operation Tests Guidance DocumentationLife Cycle Support Documents Strength of Function Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function AnalysesAcronyms AcronymsAcronym Definition DoDSHA