Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 manual Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment

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Security Target, Version 3.9

March 18, 2008

 

 

Attackers who are not TOE users: These attackers have no knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess a low skill level, a low level of motivation, limited resources to alter TOE configuration settings/parameters, and no physical access to the TOE.

TOE users: These attackers have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess a high skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE configuration settings/parameters, and physical access to the TOE, but no motivation to do so.

The threats are mitigated through the objectives identified in Section 4 - Security Objectives.

3.2.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE

The following threats are to be addressed by the TOE:

T.UNDETECT An attacker may gain undetected access due to missing, weak, and/or incorrectly implemented access controls for the restricted files or TSF Data in order to cause violations of integrity, confidentiality, or availability of the information protected by and flowing through the TOE.

T.AUTH-ERRORAn authorized user may accidentally alter the configuration of a policy that permits or denies information flow through the TOE, thereby affecting the integrity of the transmitted information.

T.DATA-MODAn attacker may intercept and alter the data transmitted between the Nortel VPN Client and the Nortel VPN Router, and/or between two Nortel VPN Routers, in order to deceive the intended recipient.

T. HACK-CRYPTOAn attacker may successfully intercept and decrypt, then recover and modify the encrypted data that is in transit between the Nortel VPN Router and VPN Client, and/or between two Nortel VPN Routers.

T.HACK

An attacker may use malformed IP packets or similar attack methods against the TSF or

 

user data protected by the TOE in order to corrupt normal operation.

3.2.2 Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment

The following threats are addressed by the TOE environment:

TE.PHYSICAL

An attacker may physically attack the Hardware appliance in order to compromise its

 

secure operation.

 

TE.AUDIT_FAILURE

An attacker may conduct an undetected attack on the information protected by the TOE

 

as a result of unreliable time stamps used by the audit mechanism, which may result in

 

failure to prevent further attacks using the same method.

 

TE.BAD_CERT

An attacker may successfully authenticate to the VPN Router using a revoked, expired

 

or untrusted certificate in order to gain access to information residing on the private

 

network.

 

 

 

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

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© 2008 Nortel Networks

 

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Revision HistoryTable of Contents Table of Tables Table of FiguresProtection Profile Claims RationalePurpose Security Target IntroductionSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance ST, TOE, and CC Identification and ConformanceConventions Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyTerminology TerminologyPrimary Admin password Product Description TOE DescriptionProduct Type Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Physical Boundary TOE Boundaries and ScopeTOE Environment Logical BoundaryEnterprise WorldUser Data Protection Security AuditCryptographic Support Security Management Identification and AuthenticationProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/ChannelsExcluded TOE Functionality Threats to Security TOE Security EnvironmentAssumptions Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Threats Addressed by the TOESecurity Objectives for the TOE Security ObjectivesIT Security Objectives Security Objectives for the EnvironmentNon-IT Security Objectives OE.TIMETOE Security Functional Requirements IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST OperationDescription ST Operation FAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Class FAU Security AuditFAUSAR.1 Audit review Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation Security Target, Version March 18 FDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPACC.2 Complete access controlClass FDP User Data Protection FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control FirewallFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUCT.1.1 FDPUIT.1.1FIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionDependencies No dependencies FMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.2.1FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesFMTSMR.1.2 FPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingClass FPT Protection of the TSF FPTRPL.1 Replay detectionFTPTRP.1 Trusted path Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1.1 FTPTRP.1.2FPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance RequirementsAssurance Components TOE Security Functions TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Description FunctionSecurity Audit Configuration LogAccounting Logs Security LogEvent Log System LogFips Validated Modules Cryptographic SupportFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate #User Data Protection Security Management Identification and AuthenticationConditional Self-Tests Power-Up Self-TestsProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/Channels TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Assurance Assurance Measure ComponentAugmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Reference Protection Profile ClaimsSecurity Objectives Rationale RationaleRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-ITHack Certificate OE.CERTIFICATE Security Functional Requirements RationaleObjectives Requirements Relationship of Security Requirements to ObjectivesEnv Functions and dataFMTMSA.3a,b,c Able to access such functionalityIntegrity Reject packets based on their attributesRationale for Strength of Function Security Assurance Requirements RationaleDependency Rationale Functional Requirements DependenciesFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Development Configuration ManagementSecure Delivery and Operation Tests Guidance DocumentationLife Cycle Support Documents Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Strength of FunctionAcronyms AcronymsAcronym Definition DoDSHA
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