Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual Security Assurance Requirements Rationale, Dependency Rationale

Page 60

Security Target, Version 3.9March 18, 2008

 

authorized users with the ability to verify the integrity of TSF Data and TSF executable code

 

[FPT_AMT.1 and FPT_TST.1].

OE.TIME

The environment must provide reliable timestamps for the time-stamping of audit events.

 

Time stamps associated with an audit record must be reliable [FPT_STM.1].

OE.PROTECT

The environment must protect the TOE from interference and tampering by untrusted

 

subjects.

 

The IT Environment must protect the TOE from intentional attacks and unintentional interference

 

[FPT_SEP.1].

OE.NONBYPASS

The environment must ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and

 

succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.

The IT Environment must ensure that the TOE receives reliable time information for time stamps from the Environment [FPT_RVM.1], and only receives it from an authorized and reliable source [FPT_STM.1].

8.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

EAL 4+ was chosen to provide a basic level of independently assured security and thorough investigation of the TOE and its development. As such, minimal additional tasks are placed upon the vendor assuming the vendor follows reasonable software engineering practices and can provide support to the evaluation for design and testing efforts. The chosen assurance level is appropriate with the threats defined for the environment. While the TOE may operate in a hostile environment, it is expected to be protected by other products and processes designed to address threats that correspond with the intended environment. At EAL 4+, the TOE will have incurred an independent vulnerability analysis to support its introduction into the hostile environment.

The augmentation of ALC_FLR.2 was chosen to give greater assurance of the developer’s on-going flaw remediation processes.

8.4 Rationale for Strength of Function

The TOE minimum strength of function is SOF-basic. The evaluated TOE is intended to operate in commercial and DoD low robustness environments processing unclassified information. This security function is consistent with the security objectives described in Section 4.

8.5 Dependency Rationale

This ST satisfies all the requirement dependencies of the CC. Table 13 lists each requirement to which the TOE claims conformance with a dependency and indicates whether the dependent requirement was included. As indicated by the table, all dependencies have been met.

Table 13 - Functional Requirements Dependencies

 

SFR ID

 

Dependencies

 

Dependency Met

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FAU_GEN.1

 

FPT_STM.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FAU_SAR.1

 

FAU_GEN.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FCS_COP.1

 

 

 

 

FCS_CKM.1(a)

 

FCS_CKM.4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FMT_MSA.2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

 

 

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© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Revision History Version Modification Date Modified By Description of ChangesTable of Contents Table of Figures Table of TablesProtection Profile Claims RationaleSecurity Target Introduction PurposeSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance ST, TOE, and CC Identification and ConformanceConventions, Acronyms, and Terminology ConventionsTerminology TerminologyPrimary Admin password TOE Description Product TypeProduct Description Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE TOE Boundaries and Scope Physical BoundaryLogical Boundary TOE EnvironmentWorld EnterpriseSecurity Audit Cryptographic SupportUser Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security ManagementProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/ChannelsExcluded TOE Functionality TOE Security Environment AssumptionsThreats to Security Threats Addressed by the TOE Threats Addressed by the TOE EnvironmentSecurity Objectives Security Objectives for the TOESecurity Objectives for the Environment IT Security ObjectivesNon-IT Security Objectives OE.TIMEIT Security Requirements TOE Security Functional RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST OperationDescription ST Operation Class FAU Security Audit FAUGEN.1 Audit Data GenerationFAUSAR.1 Audit review Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation Class FCS Cryptographic Support FCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-HellmanFCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authentication FCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generationFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing Security Target, Version March 18 FDPACC.2 Complete access control FDPACF.1 Security attribute based access controlClass FDP User Data Protection FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPNFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrityFDPUCT.1.1 FDPUIT.1.1Class FIA Identification and Authentication FIAUAU.1 Timing of authenticationFIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionDependencies No dependencies Class FMT Security Management FMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviourFMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.1c Management of security attributes FMTMSA.2 Secure security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.2.1FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisationFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesFMTSMR.1.2 FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testing FPTTST.1 TSF testingClass FPT Protection of the TSF FPTRPL.1 Replay detectionClass FTP Trusted Path/Channels FTPTRP.1 Trusted pathFTPTRP.1.1 FTPTRP.1.2Security Functional Requirements on the IT Environment FPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSPFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance ComponentsAssurance Requirements TOE Summary Specification TOE Security FunctionsTOE Security Description FunctionConfiguration Log Security AuditAccounting Logs Security LogSystem Log Event LogCryptographic Support Fips Validated ModulesFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate #User Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security ManagementPower-Up Self-Tests Protection of the TOE Security FunctionsConditional Self-Tests TOE Security Assurance Measures Trusted Path/ChannelsTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Assurance Assurance Measure ComponentAugmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Claims Protection Profile ReferenceRationale Security Objectives RationaleRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-ITHack Certificate Security Functional Requirements Rationale OE.CERTIFICATERelationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Objectives RequirementsFunctions and data EnvAble to access such functionality FMTMSA.3a,b,cReject packets based on their attributes IntegritySecurity Assurance Requirements Rationale Rationale for Strength of FunctionDependency Rationale Functional Requirements DependenciesFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Configuration Management Secure Delivery and OperationDevelopment Guidance Documentation Life Cycle Support DocumentsTests Strength of Function Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function AnalysesAcronyms AcronymsAcronym Definition DoDSHA
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