Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 manual Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses

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Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

Corresponding CC Assurance Components:

Analysis of Coverage

High-Level Design

Functional Testing

Independent Testing

8.6.2.7Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses

The Validation of Analysis documentation identifies all possible modes of operation of the TOE, their consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation. The Strength of TOE Security Function Analysis demonstrates the strength of the probabilistic or permutational mechanisms employed to provide security functions within the TOE and how they exceed the minimum SOF requirements. The Vulnerability Analysis documentation describes the analysis of the TOE deliverables performed to search for ways in which a user can violate the TSP, and the disposition of the identified vulnerabilities.

Corresponding CC Assurance Components:

Validation of Analysis

Strength of TOE Security Function Evaluation

Independent Vulnerability Analysis

8.7 Strength of Function

A Strength of Function rating of “SOF-basic” is claimed for this TOE to meet the EAL 4+ assurance requirements. This SOF is sufficient to resist the threats identified in Section 3. Section 4 provides evidence that demonstrates that TOE threats are countered by the TOE security objectives. Section 8 demonstrates that the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment are satisfied by the security requirements. The evaluated TOE is intended to operate in commercial and DoD low robustness environments processing unclassified information.

The overall TOE SOF claim is SOF-basic because this SOF is sufficient to resist the threats identified in Section 3.2. Section 8.1 provides evidence that demonstrates that TOE threats are countered by the TOE security objectives. Section 8.2 demonstrates that the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment are satisfied by the security requirements.

The relevant security functions and security functional requirements which have probabilistic or permutational functions are FIA_UAU.1, and FIA_UAU.5.

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Revision HistoryTable of Contents Table of Tables Table of FiguresProtection Profile Claims RationalePurpose Security Target IntroductionSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance ST, TOE, and CC Identification and ConformanceConventions Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyTerminology TerminologyPrimary Admin password Product Description TOE DescriptionProduct Type Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Physical Boundary TOE Boundaries and ScopeTOE Environment Logical BoundaryEnterprise WorldUser Data Protection Security AuditCryptographic Support Security Management Identification and AuthenticationProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/ChannelsExcluded TOE Functionality Threats to Security TOE Security EnvironmentAssumptions Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Threats Addressed by the TOESecurity Objectives for the TOE Security ObjectivesIT Security Objectives Security Objectives for the EnvironmentNon-IT Security Objectives OE.TIMETOE Security Functional Requirements IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST OperationDescription ST Operation FAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Class FAU Security AuditFAUSAR.1 Audit review Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation Security Target, Version March 18 FDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPACC.2 Complete access controlClass FDP User Data Protection FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control FirewallFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUCT.1.1 FDPUIT.1.1FIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionDependencies No dependencies FMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.2.1FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesFMTSMR.1.2 FPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingClass FPT Protection of the TSF FPTRPL.1 Replay detectionFTPTRP.1 Trusted path Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1.1 FTPTRP.1.2FPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance RequirementsAssurance Components TOE Security Functions TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Description FunctionSecurity Audit Configuration LogAccounting Logs Security LogEvent Log System LogFips Validated Modules Cryptographic SupportFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate #User Data Protection Security Management Identification and AuthenticationConditional Self-Tests Power-Up Self-TestsProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/Channels TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Assurance Assurance Measure ComponentAugmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Reference Protection Profile ClaimsSecurity Objectives Rationale RationaleRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-ITHack Certificate OE.CERTIFICATE Security Functional Requirements RationaleObjectives Requirements Relationship of Security Requirements to ObjectivesEnv Functions and dataFMTMSA.3a,b,c Able to access such functionalityIntegrity Reject packets based on their attributesRationale for Strength of Function Security Assurance Requirements RationaleDependency Rationale Functional Requirements DependenciesFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Development Configuration ManagementSecure Delivery and Operation Tests Guidance DocumentationLife Cycle Support Documents Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Strength of FunctionAcronyms AcronymsAcronym Definition DoDSHA