Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall

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Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

The TSF shall enforce the [VPN Information Flow Control SFP] on [remote authenticated VPN Clients connecting to a Nortel VPN Router] and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.

FDP_IFC.2.2(a)

The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TSC to flow to and from any subject in the TSC are covered by an information flow control SFP.

Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP_IFC.2(b) Complete information flow control (Firewall)

Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1

FDP_IFC.2.1(b)

The TSF shall enforce the [Firewall Information Flow Control SFP] on [hosts on either side of a Nortel VPN Router (subject), and the Nortel VPN Router (subject), and all data flowing between the subjects (information)] and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.

FDP_IFC.2.2(b)

The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TSC to flow to and from any subject in the TSC are covered by an information flow control SFP.

Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP_IFF.1(a) Simple security attributes (VPN)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FDP_IFF.1.1(a)

The TSF shall enforce the [VPN Information Flow Control SFP] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [

ouser identity,

ouser authentication credentials and tunnel filtering of packets is based on

oProtocol ID, o Direction,

o Source, destination IP addresses, o Source, destination ports,

o Service].

FDP_IFF.1.2(a)

The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [the VPN Client successfully authenticates to the Nortel VPN Router].

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11	Page 28 of 67
© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Revision History Version Modification Date Modified By Description of ChangesTable of Contents Table of Figures Table of TablesProtection Profile Claims RationaleSecurity Target Introduction PurposeSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance ST, TOE, and CC Identification and ConformanceConventions, Acronyms, and Terminology ConventionsTerminology TerminologyPrimary Admin password Product Type TOE DescriptionProduct Description Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE TOE Boundaries and Scope Physical BoundaryLogical Boundary TOE EnvironmentWorld EnterpriseCryptographic Support Security AuditUser Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security ManagementProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/ChannelsExcluded TOE Functionality Assumptions TOE Security EnvironmentThreats to Security Threats Addressed by the TOE Threats Addressed by the TOE EnvironmentSecurity Objectives Security Objectives for the TOESecurity Objectives for the Environment IT Security ObjectivesNon-IT Security Objectives OE.TIMEIT Security Requirements TOE Security Functional RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST OperationDescription ST Operation Class FAU Security Audit FAUGEN.1 Audit Data GenerationFAUSAR.1 Audit review Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation Class FCS Cryptographic Support FCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-HellmanFCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing Security Target, Version March 18 FDPACC.2 Complete access control FDPACF.1 Security attribute based access controlClass FDP User Data Protection FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPNFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrityFDPUCT.1.1 FDPUIT.1.1Class FIA Identification and Authentication FIAUAU.1 Timing of authenticationFIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionDependencies No dependencies Class FMT Security Management FMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviourFMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.1c Management of security attributes FMTMSA.2 Secure security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.2.1FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisationFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesFMTSMR.1.2 FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testing FPTTST.1 TSF testingClass FPT Protection of the TSF FPTRPL.1 Replay detectionClass FTP Trusted Path/Channels FTPTRP.1 Trusted pathFTPTRP.1.1 FTPTRP.1.2Security Functional Requirements on the IT Environment FPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSPFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Components Assurance RequirementsAssurance Requirements TOE Summary Specification TOE Security FunctionsTOE Security Description FunctionConfiguration Log Security AuditAccounting Logs Security LogSystem Log Event LogCryptographic Support Fips Validated ModulesFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate #User Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security ManagementProtection of the TOE Security Functions Power-Up Self-TestsConditional Self-Tests TOE Security Assurance Measures Trusted Path/ChannelsTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Assurance Assurance Measure ComponentAugmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Claims Protection Profile ReferenceRationale Security Objectives RationaleRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-ITHack Certificate Security Functional Requirements Rationale OE.CERTIFICATERelationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Objectives RequirementsFunctions and data EnvAble to access such functionality FMTMSA.3a,b,cReject packets based on their attributes IntegritySecurity Assurance Requirements Rationale Rationale for Strength of FunctionDependency Rationale Functional Requirements DependenciesFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Secure Delivery and Operation Configuration ManagementDevelopment Life Cycle Support Documents Guidance DocumentationTests Strength of Function Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function AnalysesAcronyms AcronymsAcronym Definition DoDSHA