Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual TOE Summary Specification Rationale

Page 62

Security Target, Version 3.9

 

 

 

 

March 18, 2008

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SFR ID

 

Dependencies

 

Dependency Met

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FPT_TST.1

 

FPT_AMT.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FTP_TRP.1

 

[none]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8.6 TOE Summary Specification Rationale

8.6.1TOE Summary Specification Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements

Each subsection in the TOE Summary Specification (Section 6) describes a security function of the TOE. Each description is organized by a set of requirements with rationale that indicates how these requirements are satisfied by aspects of the corresponding security function. The set of security functions work together to satisfy all of the security functions and assurance requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to provide the required security functionality. This section, in conjunction with the TOE Summary Specification section, provides evidence that the security functions are suitable to fulfill the TOE security requirements. Please see Section 6 - TOE Summary Specification for more details.

Table 14 identifies the relationship between security requirements and security functions, showing that all security requirements are addressed and all security functions are necessary (i.e., they correspond to at least one security requirement).

The only security mechanism that is realized by a probabilistic or permutational implementation is the password mechanism. Refer to Section 8.7 for Strength of Function.

Table 14 - Mapping of Security Functional Requirements to TOE Security Functions

 

TOE Security Function

SFR

 

 

 

 

 

 

Security Audit

FAU_GEN.1

 

 

 

FAU_SAR.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cryptographic Support

FCS_CKM.1(a)

 

 

 

FCS.CKM.4

 

 

 

FCS_COP.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

User Data Protection

FDP_ACC.2

 

 

 

FDP_ACF.1

 

 

 

FDP_IFC.2

 

 

 

FDP_IFF.1

 

 

 

FDP_UCT.1

 

 

 

FDP_UIT.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

Identification and

FIA_UAU.1

 

 

Authentication

FIA_UAU.5

 

 

 

FIA_UID.2

 

 

 

 

 

 

Security Management

FMT_MOF.1

 

 

 

FMT_MSA.1

 

 

 

FMT_MSA.2

 

 

 

FMT_MSA.3

 

 

 

FMT_SMF.1

 

 

 

FMT_SMR.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

Protection of the TSF

FPT_AMT.1

 

 

 

FPT_RPL.1

 

 

 

FPT_TST.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

Trusted Path/Channels

FTP_TRP.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

 

Page 62 of 67

© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Revision History Version Modification Date Modified By Description of ChangesTable of Contents Protection Profile Claims Table of FiguresTable of Tables RationaleSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance Security Target IntroductionPurpose ST, TOE, and CC Identification and ConformanceTerminology Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyConventions TerminologyPrimary Admin password Product Description TOE DescriptionProduct Type Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE TOE Boundaries and Scope Physical BoundaryLogical Boundary TOE EnvironmentWorld EnterpriseUser Data Protection Security AuditCryptographic Support Protection of the TOE Security Functions Identification and AuthenticationSecurity Management Trusted Path/ChannelsExcluded TOE Functionality Threats to Security TOE Security EnvironmentAssumptions Threats Addressed by the TOE Threats Addressed by the TOE EnvironmentSecurity Objectives Security Objectives for the TOENon-IT Security Objectives Security Objectives for the EnvironmentIT Security Objectives OE.TIMETOE Security Functional Requirements IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST OperationDescription ST Operation FAUSAR.1 Audit review Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation Security Target, Version March 18 Class FDP User Data Protection FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPNFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUCT.1.1 FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUIT.1.1FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionDependencies No dependencies FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.2.1FMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesFMTSMR.1.2 Class FPT Protection of the TSF FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTRPL.1 Replay detectionFTPTRP.1.1 Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1 Trusted path FTPTRP.1.2FPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance RequirementsAssurance Components TOE Security TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Functions Description FunctionAccounting Logs Configuration LogSecurity Audit Security LogSystem Log Event LogFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Cryptographic SupportFips Validated Modules Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate #User Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security ManagementConditional Self-Tests Power-Up Self-TestsProtection of the TOE Security Functions TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTrusted Path/Channels Assurance Assurance Measure ComponentAugmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Claims Protection Profile ReferenceRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives RationaleSecurity Objectives Rationale TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-ITHack Certificate Security Functional Requirements Rationale OE.CERTIFICATERelationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Objectives RequirementsFunctions and data EnvAble to access such functionality FMTMSA.3a,b,c Reject packets based on their attributes IntegrityDependency Rationale Security Assurance Requirements RationaleRationale for Strength of Function Functional Requirements DependenciesFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Development Configuration ManagementSecure Delivery and Operation Tests Guidance DocumentationLife Cycle Support Documents Strength of Function Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function AnalysesAcronym Definition AcronymsAcronyms DoDSHA