Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 manual Functions and data, Env

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Security Target, Version 3.9

March 18, 2008

 

 

 

Objectives

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Requirements

O.I&A

O.AUDIT

O.SELFPROTECT

O.CONFIDENT

O.FUNCTIONS

O.ADMIN

O.INTEGRITY

O.REPLAY

O.FILTER

O.TEST

OE.TIME

OE.PROTECT

OE.NONBYPASS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FPT_AMT.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FPT_RLT.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FPT_TST.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FTP_TRP.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Env

FPT_RVM.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FPT_SEP.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FPT_STM.1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

O.I&A

The TOE must be able to identify and authenticate users prior to allowing access to TOE

 

functions and data.

The TOE is required to enforce the Access Control SFP on subject and object by only allowing operations permitted by the Access Control SFP [FDP_ACC.2]. Prior to allowing an operation of subjects performed on an object, the TOE is required to check the authentication status and the privilege of the subject. Upon authentication, the TOE is required to provide

The Primary Admin access to all the administrative functions.

The Restricted Admin access to only authorized administrative functions while denying access to non authorized functions.

The VPN User access to only the private network protected by the VPN while denying access to the administrative functions of the VPN.[FDP_ACF.1].

The TOE is required to allow to the user access to very limited functions prior to successfully authenticating and identifying themselves. Prior to accessing the functions of the TOE, users are required to successfully identify and authenticate themselves. The TOE is required to provide to users the following authentication mechanisms: username and password, RSA digital certificates. [FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.5, and FIA_UID.2].

O.AUDIT

The TOE must record audit records for data accesses and use of the System functions.

Security-relevant events must be defined and auditable for the TOE and all audit records will be associated with a user identity [FAU_GEN.1]. The TOE must provide the ability to review the audit trail of the System [FAU_SAR.1]. Time stamps associated with an audit record must be reliable [FPT_STM.1].

O.SELFPROTECT The TOE must protect itself from unauthorized modifications and access to its functions and data.

The TOE is required to use the specified algorithms to better protect itself. The RSA suite of algorithms and the Diffie-Hellman algorithm used by the TOE for cryptographic operations must be implemented according to RFC 3447 for RSA and RFC 2631 for Diffie-Hellman. The TOE is required to destroy unused keys by zeroizing them. For encryption and decryption operations, the TOE is required to use the 3DES and AES algorithms and they must be implemented according to FIPS 46-3 for 3DES and FIPS 197 for AES. For authentication, the TOE is required to use HMAC-SHA-1 and it must be implemented according to RFC 2104. For hashing, the TOE is

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

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© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Revision HistoryTable of Contents Table of Tables Table of FiguresProtection Profile Claims RationalePurpose Security Target IntroductionSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance ST, TOE, and CC Identification and ConformanceConventions Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyTerminology TerminologyPrimary Admin password TOE Description Product TypeProduct Description Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Physical Boundary TOE Boundaries and ScopeTOE Environment Logical BoundaryEnterprise WorldSecurity Audit Cryptographic SupportUser Data Protection Security Management Identification and AuthenticationProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/ChannelsExcluded TOE Functionality TOE Security Environment AssumptionsThreats to Security Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Threats Addressed by the TOESecurity Objectives for the TOE Security ObjectivesIT Security Objectives Security Objectives for the EnvironmentNon-IT Security Objectives OE.TIMETOE Security Functional Requirements IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST OperationDescription ST Operation FAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Class FAU Security AuditFAUSAR.1 Audit review Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authentication FCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generationFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing Security Target, Version March 18 FDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPACC.2 Complete access controlClass FDP User Data Protection FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control FirewallFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUCT.1.1 FDPUIT.1.1FIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionDependencies No dependencies FMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.2.1FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesFMTSMR.1.2 FPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingClass FPT Protection of the TSF FPTRPL.1 Replay detectionFTPTRP.1 Trusted path Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1.1 FTPTRP.1.2FPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance ComponentsAssurance Requirements TOE Security Functions TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Description FunctionSecurity Audit Configuration LogAccounting Logs Security LogEvent Log System LogFips Validated Modules Cryptographic SupportFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate #User Data Protection Security Management Identification and AuthenticationPower-Up Self-Tests Protection of the TOE Security FunctionsConditional Self-Tests Trusted Path/Channels TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Assurance Assurance Measure ComponentAugmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Reference Protection Profile ClaimsSecurity Objectives Rationale RationaleRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-ITHack Certificate OE.CERTIFICATE Security Functional Requirements RationaleObjectives Requirements Relationship of Security Requirements to ObjectivesEnv Functions and dataFMTMSA.3a,b,c Able to access such functionalityIntegrity Reject packets based on their attributesRationale for Strength of Function Security Assurance Requirements RationaleDependency Rationale Functional Requirements DependenciesFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Configuration Management Secure Delivery and OperationDevelopment Guidance Documentation Life Cycle Support DocumentsTests Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Strength of FunctionAcronyms AcronymsAcronym Definition DoDSHA
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