Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 manual Security Target Introduction, Purpose

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Security Target, Version 3.9

March 18, 2008

 

 

1 Security Target Introduction

This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The Targets of Evaluation are models 600, 1010, 1050, 1100, 1750, 2750, and 5000 of the Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11. These devices are functionally identical and will hereafter be referred to, collectively, as “the TOE” throughout this document. The TOE is a Virtual Private Network (VPN) Router that ensures end-to-end network security by establishing a fully encrypted and authenticated VPN connection across the Internet between a Nortel VPN Router and either a user’s remote computer or another remote Nortel VPN Router. It also provides firewall functionality to protect the private network from attack from the public network.

1.1 Purpose

This ST contains the following sections to provide mapping of the Security Environment to the Security Requirements that the TOE meets in order to remove, diminish, or mitigate the defined threats:

Security Target Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the content of the ST and describes the organization of other sections of this document.

TOE Description (Section 2) – Provides an overview of the TOE security functions and describes the physical and logical boundaries for the TOE.

TOE Security Environment (Section 3) – Describes the threats and assumptions that pertain to the TOE and its environment.

Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE and its environment.

IT Security Requirements (Section 5) – Presents the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) met by the TOE and by the TOE’s environment.

TOE Summary Specification (Section 6) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE to satisfy the security requirements and objectives.

Protection Profile Claims (Section 7) – Provides the identification of any ST Protection Profile claims as well as a justification to support such claims.

Rationale (Section 8) – Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and the TOE summary specifications as to their consistency, completeness, and suitability.

Acronyms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms used within this ST.

1.2 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance

 

Table 1 - ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ST Title

Nortel Networks VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11 Security Target

 

 

ST Version

Version 3.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Author

Corsec Security, Inc.

 

 

 

 

Nathan Lee

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TOE Identification

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

 

 

 

Common Criteria (CC)

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (aligned

 

 

Identification and

with ISO/IEC 15408:2004), Part 2 conformant, Part 3 conformant; Parts 2 and 3

 

 

Conformance

Interpretations from the Interpreted CEM as of October 25, 2006 were reviewed, and no

 

 

 

interpretations apply to the claims made in this ST.

 

 

 

PP Identification

None

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Evaluation Assurance

EAL 4 Augmented with Flaw Remediation

 

 

 

Level

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

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© 2008 Nortel Networks

 

 

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Revision HistoryTable of Contents Table of Tables Table of FiguresProtection Profile Claims RationalePurpose Security Target IntroductionSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance ST, TOE, and CC Identification and ConformanceConventions Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyTerminology TerminologyPrimary Admin password Product Description TOE DescriptionProduct Type Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Physical Boundary TOE Boundaries and ScopeTOE Environment Logical BoundaryEnterprise WorldUser Data Protection Security AuditCryptographic Support Security Management Identification and AuthenticationProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/ChannelsExcluded TOE Functionality Threats to Security TOE Security EnvironmentAssumptions Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Threats Addressed by the TOESecurity Objectives for the TOE Security ObjectivesIT Security Objectives Security Objectives for the EnvironmentNon-IT Security Objectives OE.TIMETOE Security Functional Requirements IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST OperationDescription ST Operation FAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Class FAU Security AuditFAUSAR.1 Audit review Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation Security Target, Version March 18 FDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPACC.2 Complete access controlClass FDP User Data Protection FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control FirewallFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUCT.1.1 FDPUIT.1.1FIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionDependencies No dependencies FMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.2.1FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesFMTSMR.1.2 FPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingClass FPT Protection of the TSF FPTRPL.1 Replay detectionFTPTRP.1 Trusted path Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1.1 FTPTRP.1.2FPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance RequirementsAssurance Components TOE Security Functions TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Description FunctionSecurity Audit Configuration LogAccounting Logs Security LogEvent Log System LogFips Validated Modules Cryptographic SupportFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate #User Data Protection Security Management Identification and AuthenticationConditional Self-Tests Power-Up Self-TestsProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/Channels TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Assurance Assurance Measure ComponentAugmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Reference Protection Profile ClaimsSecurity Objectives Rationale RationaleRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-ITHack Certificate OE.CERTIFICATE Security Functional Requirements RationaleObjectives Requirements Relationship of Security Requirements to ObjectivesEnv Functions and dataFMTMSA.3a,b,c Able to access such functionalityIntegrity Reject packets based on their attributesRationale for Strength of Function Security Assurance Requirements RationaleDependency Rationale Functional Requirements DependenciesFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Development Configuration ManagementSecure Delivery and Operation Tests Guidance DocumentationLife Cycle Support Documents Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Strength of FunctionAcronyms AcronymsAcronym Definition DoDSHA