Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 manual Assurance Requirements, Assurance Components

Page 41

Security Target, Version 3.9

March 18, 2008

 

 

5.3 Assurance Requirements

This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. The assurance requirements are taken from Part 3 of the CC and are EAL 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2. Table 6 below summarizes the components.

Table 6 - Assurance Components

 

 

Assurance Requirements

 

 

 

 

 

 

Class ACM:

ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation

 

Configuration management

 

 

ACM_CAP.4 General support and acceptance procedures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ACM_SCP.2 Problem tracking CM coverage

 

 

 

 

Class ADO:

ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification

 

Delivery and operation

 

 

ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures

 

 

 

 

 

 

Class ADV:

ADV_FSP.2 Fully defined external interfaces

 

Development

 

 

ADV_HLD.2 Security-enforcing high-level design

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF

 

 

 

 

 

ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design

 

 

 

 

 

ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration

 

 

 

 

 

ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model

 

 

 

 

Class AGD:

AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance

 

Guidance documents

 

 

AGD_USR.1 User guidance

 

 

 

 

 

 

Class ALC:

ALC_DVS.1 Development security

 

Life cycle support

 

 

ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined Life cycle model

 

 

 

 

 

ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools

 

 

 

 

Class ATE:

ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage

 

Tests

 

 

ATE_DPT.1 Testing: high-level design

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing

 

 

 

 

 

ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample

 

 

 

 

Class AVA:

AVA_MSU.2 Validation of analysis

 

Vulnerability assessment

 

 

AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis

 

 

 

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

Page 41 of 67

© 2008 Nortel Networks

 

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Revision HistoryTable of Contents Table of Tables Table of FiguresProtection Profile Claims RationalePurpose Security Target IntroductionSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance ST, TOE, and CC Identification and ConformanceConventions Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyTerminology TerminologyPrimary Admin password Product Description TOE DescriptionProduct Type Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Physical Boundary TOE Boundaries and ScopeTOE Environment Logical BoundaryEnterprise WorldUser Data Protection Security AuditCryptographic Support Security Management Identification and AuthenticationProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/ChannelsExcluded TOE Functionality Threats to Security TOE Security EnvironmentAssumptions Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Threats Addressed by the TOESecurity Objectives for the TOE Security ObjectivesIT Security Objectives Security Objectives for the EnvironmentNon-IT Security Objectives OE.TIMETOE Security Functional Requirements IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST OperationDescription ST Operation FAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Class FAU Security AuditFAUSAR.1 Audit review Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation Security Target, Version March 18 FDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPACC.2 Complete access controlClass FDP User Data Protection FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control FirewallFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUCT.1.1 FDPUIT.1.1FIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionDependencies No dependencies FMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.2.1FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesFMTSMR.1.2 FPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingClass FPT Protection of the TSF FPTRPL.1 Replay detection FTPTRP.1 Trusted path Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels FTPTRP.1.1 FTPTRP.1.2FPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance RequirementsAssurance Components TOE Security Functions TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Description FunctionSecurity Audit Configuration LogAccounting Logs Security LogEvent Log System LogFips Validated Modules Cryptographic SupportFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate #User Data Protection Security Management Identification and AuthenticationConditional Self-Tests Power-Up Self-TestsProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/Channels TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Assurance Assurance Measure ComponentAugmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Reference Protection Profile ClaimsSecurity Objectives Rationale RationaleRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-ITHack Certificate OE.CERTIFICATE Security Functional Requirements RationaleObjectives Requirements Relationship of Security Requirements to ObjectivesEnv Functions and dataFMTMSA.3a,b,c Able to access such functionalityIntegrity Reject packets based on their attributesRationale for Strength of Function Security Assurance Requirements RationaleDependency Rationale Functional Requirements DependenciesFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Development Configuration ManagementSecure Delivery and Operation Tests Guidance DocumentationLife Cycle Support Documents Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Strength of FunctionAcronyms AcronymsAcronym Definition DoDSHA
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