Nortel Networks 7.05 Table of Figures, Table of Tables, Protection Profile Claims, Rationale

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Security Target, Version 3.9March 18, 2008

7

PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS

51

 

7.1

PROTECTION PROFILE REFERENCE

51

8

RATIONALE

52

 

8.1

SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE

52

 

8.2

SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE

55

 

8.3

SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE

60

 

8.4

RATIONALE FOR STRENGTH OF FUNCTION

60

 

8.5

DEPENDENCY RATIONALE

60

 

8.6

TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE

62

 

8.6.1

TOE Summary Specification Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements

62

 

8.6.2

TOE Summary Specification Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements

63

 

8.7

STRENGTH OF FUNCTION

65

9

ACRONYMS

66

Table of Figures

FIGURE 1 – VPN CLIENT DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION OF THE TOE

8

FIGURE 2 – BRANCH OFFICE DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION OF THE TOE

9

FIGURE 3

- PHYSICAL TOE BOUNDARY

10

FIGURE 4

- PHYSICAL TOE BOUNDARY IN BRANCH OFFICE TUNNEL MODE

10

FIGURE 5

- TOE LOGICAL BOUNDARY

12

FIGURE 6

- TOE LOGICAL BOUNDARY IN BRANCH OFFICE TUNNEL MODE

12

Table of Tables

TABLE 1 - ST, TOE, AND CC IDENTIFICATION AND CONFORMANCE

5

TABLE 2 - TERMINOLOGY

6

TABLE 3 - TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

20

TABLE 4 - AUDITABLE EVENTS

22

TABLE 5 - IT ENVIRONMENT SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

39

TABLE 6

- ASSURANCE COMPONENTS

41

TABLE 7

- MAPPING OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

42

TABLE 8

- FIPS-VALIDATEDCRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS

45

TABLE 9

- ASSURANCE MEASURES MAPPING TO TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS (SARS)

49

TABLE 10 - RELATIONSHIP OF SECURITY THREATS TO OBJECTIVES

52

TABLE 11

- RELATIONSHIP OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS TO OBJECTIVES

56

TABLE 12

- FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES

60

TABLE 13

- MAPPING OF SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS

62

TABLE 14

- ACRONYMS

66

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

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© 2008 Nortel Networks

 

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Revision History Version Modification Date Modified By Description of ChangesTable of Contents Table of Figures Table of TablesProtection Profile Claims RationaleSecurity Target Introduction PurposeSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance ST, TOE, and CC Identification and ConformanceConventions, Acronyms, and Terminology ConventionsTerminology TerminologyPrimary Admin password Product Type TOE DescriptionProduct Description Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE TOE Boundaries and Scope Physical BoundaryLogical Boundary TOE EnvironmentWorld EnterpriseCryptographic Support Security AuditUser Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security ManagementProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/ChannelsExcluded TOE Functionality Assumptions TOE Security EnvironmentThreats to Security Threats Addressed by the TOE Threats Addressed by the TOE EnvironmentSecurity Objectives Security Objectives for the TOESecurity Objectives for the Environment IT Security ObjectivesNon-IT Security Objectives OE.TIMEIT Security Requirements TOE Security Functional RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST OperationDescription ST Operation Class FAU Security Audit FAUGEN.1 Audit Data GenerationFAUSAR.1 Audit review Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation Class FCS Cryptographic Support FCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-HellmanFCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing Security Target, Version March 18 FDPACC.2 Complete access control FDPACF.1 Security attribute based access controlClass FDP User Data Protection FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPNFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrityFDPUCT.1.1 FDPUIT.1.1Class FIA Identification and Authentication FIAUAU.1 Timing of authenticationFIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionDependencies No dependencies Class FMT Security Management FMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviourFMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.1c Management of security attributes FMTMSA.2 Secure security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.2.1FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisationFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesFMTSMR.1.2 FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testing FPTTST.1 TSF testingClass FPT Protection of the TSF FPTRPL.1 Replay detectionClass FTP Trusted Path/Channels FTPTRP.1 Trusted pathFTPTRP.1.1 FTPTRP.1.2Security Functional Requirements on the IT Environment FPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSPFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Components Assurance RequirementsAssurance Requirements TOE Summary Specification TOE Security FunctionsTOE Security Description FunctionConfiguration Log Security AuditAccounting Logs Security LogSystem Log Event LogCryptographic Support Fips Validated ModulesFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate #User Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security ManagementProtection of the TOE Security Functions Power-Up Self-TestsConditional Self-Tests TOE Security Assurance Measures Trusted Path/ChannelsTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Assurance Assurance Measure ComponentAugmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Claims Protection Profile ReferenceRationale Security Objectives RationaleRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-ITHack Certificate Security Functional Requirements Rationale OE.CERTIFICATERelationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Objectives RequirementsFunctions and data EnvAble to access such functionality FMTMSA.3a,b,cReject packets based on their attributes IntegritySecurity Assurance Requirements Rationale Rationale for Strength of FunctionDependency Rationale Functional Requirements DependenciesFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Secure Delivery and Operation Configuration ManagementDevelopment Life Cycle Support Documents Guidance DocumentationTests Strength of Function Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function AnalysesAcronyms AcronymsAcronym Definition DoDSHA