Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 manual Dependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation

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Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11	Page 23 of 67
© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Revision HistoryTable of Contents Rationale Table of FiguresTable of Tables Protection Profile ClaimsST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance Security Target IntroductionPurpose Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and ConformanceTerminology Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyConventions TerminologyPrimary Admin password Product Description TOE DescriptionProduct Type Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Physical Boundary TOE Boundaries and ScopeTOE Environment Logical BoundaryEnterprise WorldUser Data Protection Security AuditCryptographic Support Trusted Path/Channels Identification and AuthenticationSecurity Management Protection of the TOE Security FunctionsExcluded TOE Functionality Threats to Security TOE Security EnvironmentAssumptions Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Threats Addressed by the TOESecurity Objectives for the TOE Security ObjectivesOE.TIME Security Objectives for the EnvironmentIT Security Objectives Non-IT Security Objectives ST Operation IT Security Requirements TOE Security Functional Requirements TOE Security Functional RequirementsDescription ST Operation Auditable Events Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation FAUSAR.1 Audit reviewDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman FCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSAFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation Security Target, Version March 18 FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPN FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control Class FDP User Data ProtectionFDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control FirewallFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1.1 FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1.1FIAUID.2 User identification before any action Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanismsDependencies No dependencies FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributes Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviourFMTMSA.2.1 FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisationFMTSMR.1 Security roles FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisationFMTSMR.1.2 FPTRPL.1 Replay detection FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing Class FPT Protection of the TSFFTPTRP.1.2 Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1 Trusted path FTPTRP.1.1FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stamps Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSEP.1 TSF domain separationSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance RequirementsAssurance Components Description Function TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Functions TOE SecuritySecurity Log Configuration LogSecurity Audit Accounting LogsEvent Log System LogValidation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate # Cryptographic SupportFips Validated Modules FIPS-Validated Cryptographic AlgorithmsUser Data Protection Security Management Identification and AuthenticationConditional Self-Tests Power-Up Self-TestsProtection of the TOE Security Functions Assurance Assurance Measure Component TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTrusted Path/Channels TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Reference Protection Profile ClaimsTOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-IT RationaleSecurity Objectives Rationale Relationship of Security Threats to ObjectivesHack Certificate OE.CERTIFICATE Security Functional Requirements RationaleObjectives Requirements Relationship of Security Requirements to ObjectivesEnv Functions and dataFMTMSA.3a,b,c Able to access such functionalityIntegrity Reject packets based on their attributesFunctional Requirements Dependencies Security Assurance Requirements RationaleRationale for Strength of Function Dependency RationaleFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Development Configuration ManagementSecure Delivery and Operation Tests Guidance DocumentationLife Cycle Support Documents Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Strength of FunctionDoD AcronymsAcronyms Acronym DefinitionSHA