Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 manual Class FIA Identification and Authentication

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Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

5.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication

FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FIA_UAU.1.1

The TSF shall allow [

oconnection configuration, o username entry,

o password entry,

o destination selection,

o authentication options (digital certificates, username, password), o keepalive options,

o autoconnect,

o name server options

] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2

The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FIA_UAU.5.1

The TSF shall provide [username and password (for administrators), RSA Digital Certificates] to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2

The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the [configurations as defined by administrators and these configurations include:

oUsername and Password (for administrators) o RSA Digital Certificates].

Dependencies: No dependencies

FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action

Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1

FIA_UID.2.1

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Contents Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Revision HistoryTable of Contents Rationale Table of FiguresTable of Tables Protection Profile ClaimsST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance Security Target IntroductionPurpose Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and ConformanceTerminology Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyConventions TerminologyPrimary Admin password Product Type TOE DescriptionProduct Description Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Physical Boundary TOE Boundaries and ScopeTOE Environment Logical BoundaryEnterprise WorldCryptographic Support Security AuditUser Data Protection Trusted Path/Channels Identification and AuthenticationSecurity Management Protection of the TOE Security FunctionsExcluded TOE Functionality Assumptions TOE Security EnvironmentThreats to Security Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Threats Addressed by the TOESecurity Objectives for the TOE Security ObjectivesOE.TIME Security Objectives for the EnvironmentIT Security Objectives Non-IT Security ObjectivesST Operation IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements TOE Security Functional RequirementsDescription ST Operation Auditable Events Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation FAUSAR.1 Audit reviewDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman FCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSAFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing Security Target, Version March 18 FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPN FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control Class FDP User Data Protection FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control FirewallFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1.1 FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1.1FIAUID.2 User identification before any action Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanismsDependencies No dependencies FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributes Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviourFMTMSA.2.1 FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisationFMTSMR.1 Security roles FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisationFMTSMR.1.2 FPTRPL.1 Replay detection FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing Class FPT Protection of the TSFFTPTRP.1.2 Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1 Trusted path FTPTRP.1.1FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stamps Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSEP.1 TSF domain separationSecurity Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Components Assurance RequirementsAssurance Requirements Description Function TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Functions TOE SecuritySecurity Log Configuration LogSecurity Audit Accounting LogsEvent Log System LogValidation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate # Cryptographic SupportFips Validated Modules FIPS-Validated Cryptographic AlgorithmsUser Data Protection Security Management Identification and AuthenticationProtection of the TOE Security Functions Power-Up Self-TestsConditional Self-Tests Assurance Assurance Measure Component TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTrusted Path/Channels TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Reference Protection Profile ClaimsTOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-IT RationaleSecurity Objectives Rationale Relationship of Security Threats to ObjectivesHack Certificate OE.CERTIFICATE Security Functional Requirements RationaleObjectives Requirements Relationship of Security Requirements to ObjectivesEnv Functions and dataFMTMSA.3a,b,c Able to access such functionalityIntegrity Reject packets based on their attributesFunctional Requirements Dependencies Security Assurance Requirements RationaleRationale for Strength of Function Dependency RationaleFCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Secure Delivery and Operation Configuration ManagementDevelopment Life Cycle Support Documents Guidance DocumentationTests Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Strength of FunctionDoD AcronymsAcronyms Acronym DefinitionSHA