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Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 TOE Boundaries and Scope, Physical Boundary, Physical TOE Boundary

Models: 7.11 7.05

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2.3 TOE Boundaries and Scope

Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

Configuration of the TOE is performed via a Command Line Interface (CLI) by physically connecting a device (such as a laptop) to the serial interface of the TOE and utilizing dumb-terminal software. After the TOE is configured, it can be managed remotely via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) which is accessed by a management workstation connected to the protected and trusted internal network.

2.3 TOE Boundaries and Scope

This section identifies the physical and logical components of the TOE that are included in this evaluation.

2.3.1 Physical Boundary

Figure 3 and Figure 4 below illustrates the physical boundary of this CC evaluation:

Legend:

TOE Boundary

The World		Enterprise
	VPN Tunnel	Corporate
		Corporate
	Internet	Network
	Internet
Nortel	Nortel VPN Router
VPN Client	Nortel VPN Router
VPN Client
Workstation
		Corporate
		Servers
	CLI Workstation	Management
		Workstation

Figure 3 - Physical TOE Boundary

Figure 4 - Physical TOE Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

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© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual TOE Boundaries and Scope, Physical Boundary, Physical TOE Boundary

Contents

Prepared by Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4+ Document VersionPrepared for Nortel NetworksModification Date Revision HistoryVersion Modified ByTOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION Table of ContentsTABLE OF CONTENTS REVISION HISTORYPROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS Table of FiguresTable of Tables RATIONALE1.2 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance 1 Security Target Introduction1.1 Purpose Table 1 - ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance1.3.2 Terminology 1.3 Conventions, Acronyms, and Terminology1.3.1 Conventions Table 2 - TerminologyView Nortel VPN Router rights Primary Admin passwordPage 7 of 2.1 Product Type Figure 1 - VPN Client Deployment Configuration of the TOE2 TOE Description 2.2 Product DescriptionFigure 2 - Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE 2.3.1 Physical Boundary Figure 4 - Physical TOE Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode2.3 TOE Boundaries and Scope Figure 3 - Physical TOE Boundary2.3.2 Logical Boundary 2.3.1.1 TOE EnvironmentThe World Nortel VPN Switch Software VxWorks OS Contivity Hardware ApplianceFigure 6 - TOE Logical Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode Software2.3.2.2 Cryptographic Support 2.3.2.1 Security Audit2.3.2.3 User Data Protection 2.3.2.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions 2.3.2.4 Identification and Authentication2.3.2.5 Security Management 2.3.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels2.3.3 Excluded TOE Functionality 3.1 Assumptions 3 TOE Security Environment3.2 Threats to Security T.HACK 3.2.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE3.2.2 Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment TE.PHYSICAL4 Security Objectives 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE4.2.1 IT Security Objectives 4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements 5 IT Security RequirementsTable 3 - TOE Security Functional Requirements Page 21 of FAUSAR.1 Audit review 5.1.1 Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Table 4 - Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation Page 23 ofCryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman 5.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a FCSCKM.1bFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation random number generationFCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FDPITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, orFCSCKM.1 Cryptographic key generation FMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes5.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPNFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityPage 30 of FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms 5.1.4 Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionPage 32 of FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour 5.1.5 Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes Page 34 ofFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesThe TSF shall be able to associate users with roles Page 36 of5.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the TSF FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTRPL.1 Replay detection5.1.7 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels FTPTRP.1 Trusted pathFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation 5.2 Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsPage 40 of 5.3 Assurance Requirements Table 6 - Assurance Components6 TOE Summary Specification 6.1 TOE Security FunctionsAccounting Logs 6.1.1 Security AuditConfiguration Log Security LogEvent Log System LogTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FAUGEN.1, FAUSAR.1 Table 8 - FIPS Validated Modules 6.1.2 Cryptographic SupportTable 9 - FIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms 6.1.3 User Data Protection Page 46 of6.1.4 Identification and Authentication 6.1.5 Security Management6.1.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions 6.1.6.1 Power-Up Self-Tests6.1.6.2 Conditional Self-Tests 6.2 TOE Security Assurance Measures 6.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels8 Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Page 50 of7 Protection Profile Claims 7.1 Protection Profile Reference8.1 Security Objectives Rationale 8 RationaleTable 11 - Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives T.HACK 2008 Nortel Networks Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client WorkstationPage 54 of 8.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale Page 55 ofObjectives Table 12 - Relationship of Security Requirements to ObjectivesRequirements  The Primary Admin access to all the administrative functions that are used to enforce the SFP FMTMSA.3a,b,c O.REPLAY 8.5 Dependency Rationale 8.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale8.4 Rationale for Strength of Function Table 13 - Functional Requirements DependenciesMet by hierarchical SFR FIAUID.2 9 Met by hierarchical SFR FDPACC.2Met by hierarchical SFR FDPIFC.2 SFR IDFCSCOP.1 8.6 TOE Summary Specification RationaleFDPUCT.1 8.6.2.2 Secure Delivery and Operation 8.6.2.1 Configuration Management8.6.2.3 Development 8.6.2.6 Tests 8.6.2.4 Guidance Documentation8.6.2.5 Life Cycle Support Documents Page 64 of8.7 Strength of Function 8.6.2.7 Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses9 Acronyms Table 15 - AcronymsPage 67 of