TOE Boundaries and Scope, Physical Boundary | Nortel Networks 7.05

Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

Configuration of the TOE is performed via a Command Line Interface (CLI) by physically connecting a device (such as a laptop) to the serial interface of the TOE and utilizing dumb-terminal software. After the TOE is configured, it can be managed remotely via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) which is accessed by a management workstation connected to the protected and trusted internal network.

2.3 TOE Boundaries and Scope

This section identifies the physical and logical components of the TOE that are included in this evaluation.

2.3.1 Physical Boundary

Figure 3 and Figure 4 below illustrates the physical boundary of this CC evaluation:

Legend:

TOE Boundary

The World		Enterprise
	VPN Tunnel	Corporate
		Corporate
	Internet	Network
	Internet
Nortel	Nortel VPN Router
VPN Client	Nortel VPN Router
VPN Client
Workstation
		Corporate
		Servers
	CLI Workstation	Management
		Workstation

Figure 3 - Physical TOE Boundary

Figure 4 - Physical TOE Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11

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Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual TOE Boundaries and Scope, Physical Boundary

Contents

Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Revision History Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Table of Contents Protection Profile Claims Table of FiguresTable of Tables Rationale Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance Security Target IntroductionPurpose ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance Terminology Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyConventions Terminology Primary Admin password Product Type TOE DescriptionProduct Description Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE TOE Boundaries and Scope Physical Boundary Logical Boundary TOE Environment World Enterprise Cryptographic Support Security AuditUser Data Protection Protection of the TOE Security Functions Identification and AuthenticationSecurity Management Trusted Path/Channels Excluded TOE Functionality Assumptions TOE Security EnvironmentThreats to Security Threats Addressed by the TOE Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Security Objectives Security Objectives for the TOE Non-IT Security Objectives Security Objectives for the EnvironmentIT Security Objectives OE.TIME TOE Security Functional Requirements IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST Operation Description ST Operation FAUSAR.1 Audit review Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Auditable Events Dependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing Security Target, Version March 18 Class FDP User Data Protection FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUCT.1.1 FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUIT.1.1 FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUID.2 User identification before any action Dependencies No dependencies FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributes FMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.2.1 FMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security roles FMTSMR.1.2 Class FPT Protection of the TSF FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTRPL.1 Replay detection FTPTRP.1.1 Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1 Trusted path FTPTRP.1.2 FPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stamps Security Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Components Assurance RequirementsAssurance Requirements TOE Security TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Functions Description Function Accounting Logs Configuration LogSecurity Audit Security Log System Log Event Log FIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Cryptographic SupportFips Validated Modules Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate # User Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security Management Protection of the TOE Security Functions Power-Up Self-TestsConditional Self-Tests TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTrusted Path/Channels Assurance Assurance Measure Component Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Claims Protection Profile Reference Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives RationaleSecurity Objectives Rationale TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-IT Hack Certificate Security Functional Requirements Rationale OE.CERTIFICATE Relationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Objectives Requirements Functions and data Env Able to access such functionality FMTMSA.3a,b,c Reject packets based on their attributes Integrity Dependency Rationale Security Assurance Requirements RationaleRationale for Strength of Function Functional Requirements Dependencies FCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Secure Delivery and Operation Configuration ManagementDevelopment Life Cycle Support Documents Guidance DocumentationTests Strength of Function Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Acronym Definition AcronymsAcronyms DoD SHA