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Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 Class FPT Protection of the TSF, FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testing

Models: 7.11 7.05

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Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

5.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF

FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FPT_AMT.1.1

The TSF shall run a suite of tests [during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation] to demonstrate the correct operation of the security assumptions provided by the abstract machine that underlies the TSF.

Dependencies: No dependencies

FPT_RPL.1 Replay detection

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FPT_RPL.1.1

The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: [the IPSec sessions].

FPT_RPL.1.2

The TSF shall perform [drop packets] when replay is detected.

Dependencies: No dependencies

FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FPT_TST.1.1

The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [during initial start-up, at the conditions [when running in Normal mode]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [the TSF].

FPT_TST.1.2

The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [TSF data].

FPT_TST.1.3

The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.

Dependencies: FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11	Page 37 of 67
© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 Class FPT Protection of the TSF, FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testing, FPTRPL.1 Replay detection

Contents

Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Revision History Table of Contents Table of Tables Table of FiguresProtection Profile Claims Rationale Purpose Security Target IntroductionSecurity Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance Conventions Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyTerminology Terminology Primary Admin password Product Type TOE DescriptionProduct Description Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Physical Boundary TOE Boundaries and Scope TOE Environment Logical Boundary Enterprise World Cryptographic Support Security AuditUser Data Protection Security Management Identification and AuthenticationProtection of the TOE Security Functions Trusted Path/Channels Excluded TOE Functionality Assumptions TOE Security EnvironmentThreats to Security Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Threats Addressed by the TOE Security Objectives for the TOE Security Objectives IT Security Objectives Security Objectives for the EnvironmentNon-IT Security Objectives OE.TIME TOE Security Functional Requirements IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST Operation Description ST Operation FAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Class FAU Security AuditFAUSAR.1 Audit review Auditable Events Dependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing Security Target, Version March 18 FDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPACC.2 Complete access controlClass FDP User Data Protection FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPN FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUCT.1.1 FDPUIT.1.1 FIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIAUID.2 User identification before any action Dependencies No dependencies FMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributes FMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.2.1 FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security roles FMTSMR.1.2 FPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingClass FPT Protection of the TSF FPTRPL.1 Replay detection FTPTRP.1 Trusted path Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1.1 FTPTRP.1.2 FPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stamps Security Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Components Assurance RequirementsAssurance Requirements TOE Security Functions TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Description Function Security Audit Configuration LogAccounting Logs Security Log Event Log System Log Fips Validated Modules Cryptographic SupportFIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate # User Data Protection Security Management Identification and Authentication Protection of the TOE Security Functions Power-Up Self-TestsConditional Self-Tests Trusted Path/Channels TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Assurance Assurance Measure Component Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Reference Protection Profile Claims Security Objectives Rationale RationaleRelationship of Security Threats to Objectives TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-IT Hack Certificate OE.CERTIFICATE Security Functional Requirements Rationale Objectives Requirements Relationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Env Functions and data FMTMSA.3a,b,c Able to access such functionality Integrity Reject packets based on their attributes Rationale for Strength of Function Security Assurance Requirements RationaleDependency Rationale Functional Requirements Dependencies FCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Secure Delivery and Operation Configuration ManagementDevelopment Life Cycle Support Documents Guidance DocumentationTests Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Strength of Function Acronyms AcronymsAcronym Definition DoD SHA