FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation | Nortel Networks 7.11

Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

FMT_MSA.3(b) Static attribute initialisation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT_MSA.3.1(b)

The TSF shall enforce the [Firewall Information Control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT_MSA.3.2(b)

The TSF shall allow the [Primary Admin] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MSA.3(c) Static attribute initialisation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT_MSA.3.1(c)

The TSF shall enforce the [VPN Information Control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT_MSA.3.2(c)

The TSF shall allow the [Primary Admin] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT_SMF.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [Management of creation of roles and assigning rights, determining the administrator functions, management of Access Control policies, management of Firewall and VPN information flow policies, management of audit records, management of cryptographic functions, performing self tests].

Dependencies: No Dependencies

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT_SMR.1.1

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Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 manual FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation, FMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation

Contents

Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Revision History Table of Contents Rationale Table of FiguresTable of Tables Protection Profile Claims ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance Security Target IntroductionPurpose Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance Terminology Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyConventions Terminology Primary Admin password Product Description TOE DescriptionProduct Type Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Physical Boundary TOE Boundaries and Scope TOE Environment Logical Boundary Enterprise World User Data Protection Security AuditCryptographic Support Trusted Path/Channels Identification and AuthenticationSecurity Management Protection of the TOE Security Functions Excluded TOE Functionality Threats to Security TOE Security EnvironmentAssumptions Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Threats Addressed by the TOE Security Objectives for the TOE Security Objectives OE.TIME Security Objectives for the EnvironmentIT Security Objectives Non-IT Security Objectives ST Operation IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements TOE Security Functional Requirements Description ST Operation Auditable Events Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation FAUSAR.1 Audit review Dependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman FCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation Security Target, Version March 18 FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPN FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control Class FDP User Data Protection FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1.1 FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1.1 FIAUID.2 User identification before any action Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms Dependencies No dependencies FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributes Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.2.1 FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security roles FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1.2 FPTRPL.1 Replay detection FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing Class FPT Protection of the TSF FTPTRP.1.2 Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1 Trusted path FTPTRP.1.1 FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stamps Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation Security Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance RequirementsAssurance Components Description Function TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Functions TOE Security Security Log Configuration LogSecurity Audit Accounting Logs Event Log System Log Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate # Cryptographic SupportFips Validated Modules FIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms User Data Protection Security Management Identification and Authentication Conditional Self-Tests Power-Up Self-TestsProtection of the TOE Security Functions Assurance Assurance Measure Component TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTrusted Path/Channels TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Reference Protection Profile Claims TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-IT RationaleSecurity Objectives Rationale Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives Hack Certificate OE.CERTIFICATE Security Functional Requirements Rationale Objectives Requirements Relationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Env Functions and data FMTMSA.3a,b,c Able to access such functionality Integrity Reject packets based on their attributes Functional Requirements Dependencies Security Assurance Requirements RationaleRationale for Strength of Function Dependency Rationale FCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Development Configuration ManagementSecure Delivery and Operation Tests Guidance DocumentationLife Cycle Support Documents Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Strength of Function DoD AcronymsAcronyms Acronym Definition SHA