Security Objectives | Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 specs

Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

4 Security Objectives

This section identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment. The security objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and its environment in meeting the security needs.

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The specific security objectives are as follows:

O.I&A	The TOE must be able to identify and authenticate users prior to allowing access to TOE
	functions and data.
O.AUDIT	The TOE must record audit records for data accesses and use of the System functions.
O.SELFPROTECT	The TOE must protect itself from unauthorized modifications and access to its functions
	and data.
O.FUNCTIONS	The TOE must provide functionality that enables only authorized users to establish VPN
	sessions with the TOE using the IPSec protocol.
O.ADMIN	The TOE must provide facilities to enable an authorized administrator to effectively
	manage the TOE and its security function, and must ensure that only authorized
	administrators are able to access such functionality.
O.TEST	The TOE must provide functionality that enables testing of its correct functioning and
	integrity.
O.REPLAY	The TOE must provide functionality that enables detection of replay attack and take
	appropriate action if an attack is detected.
O.CONFIDENT	The TOE must use the IPSec tunneling protocol to ensure confidentiality of data
	transmitted between the Nortel VPN Client and the Nortel VPN Router, and/or between
	two Nortel VPN Routers.
O.INTEGRITY	The TOE must use the IPSec tunneling protocol to ensure integrity of data transmitted
	between the Nortel VPN Client and the Nortel VPN Router, and/or between two Nortel
	VPN Routers.
O.FILTER	The TOE must filter all incoming and outgoing packets that pass through it, and accept or
	reject packets based on their attributes.

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11	Page 18 of 67
© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual Security Objectives for the TOE

Contents

Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Revision History Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Table of Contents Protection Profile Claims Table of FiguresTable of Tables Rationale Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance Security Target IntroductionPurpose ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance Terminology Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyConventions Terminology Primary Admin password TOE Description Product TypeProduct Description Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE TOE Boundaries and Scope Physical Boundary Logical Boundary TOE Environment World Enterprise Security Audit Cryptographic SupportUser Data Protection Protection of the TOE Security Functions Identification and AuthenticationSecurity Management Trusted Path/Channels Excluded TOE Functionality TOE Security Environment AssumptionsThreats to Security Threats Addressed by the TOE Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Security Objectives Security Objectives for the TOE Non-IT Security Objectives Security Objectives for the EnvironmentIT Security Objectives OE.TIME TOE Security Functional Requirements IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST Operation Description ST Operation FAUSAR.1 Audit review Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Auditable Events Dependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authentication FCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generationFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing Security Target, Version March 18 Class FDP User Data Protection FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUCT.1.1 FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUIT.1.1 FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUID.2 User identification before any action Dependencies No dependencies FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributes FMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.2.1 FMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security roles FMTSMR.1.2 Class FPT Protection of the TSF FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTRPL.1 Replay detection FTPTRP.1.1 Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1 Trusted path FTPTRP.1.2 FPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stamps Security Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance ComponentsAssurance Requirements TOE Security TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Functions Description Function Accounting Logs Configuration LogSecurity Audit Security Log System Log Event Log FIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Cryptographic SupportFips Validated Modules Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate # User Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security Management Power-Up Self-Tests Protection of the TOE Security FunctionsConditional Self-Tests TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTrusted Path/Channels Assurance Assurance Measure Component Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Claims Protection Profile Reference Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives RationaleSecurity Objectives Rationale TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-IT Hack Certificate Security Functional Requirements Rationale OE.CERTIFICATE Relationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Objectives Requirements Functions and data Env Able to access such functionality FMTMSA.3a,b,c Reject packets based on their attributes Integrity Dependency Rationale Security Assurance Requirements RationaleRationale for Strength of Function Functional Requirements Dependencies FCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Configuration Management Secure Delivery and OperationDevelopment Guidance Documentation Life Cycle Support DocumentsTests Strength of Function Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Acronym Definition AcronymsAcronyms DoD SHA