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Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual IT Security Requirements, TOE Security Functional Requirements

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Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

5 IT Security Requirements

This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) met by the TOE as well as SFRs met by the TOE IT environment. These requirements are presented following the conventions identified in Section 1.3.1.

5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE. This section organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 3 identifies all SFRs implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each requirement.

Table 3 - TOE Security Functional Requirements

					ST Operation
					ST Operation

	SFR ID		Description		Selection	Assignment	Refinement	Iteration
					Selection	Assignment	Refinement	Iteration


	FAU_GEN.1		Audit Data Generation			
	FAU_GEN.1		Audit Data Generation

	FAU_SAR.1		Audit Review			
	FAU_SAR.1		Audit Review

	FCS_CKM.1(a)		Cryptographic Key Generation			
	FCS_CKM.1(a)		Cryptographic Key Generation

	FCS_CKM.4		Cryptographic Key Destruction			
	FCS_CKM.4		Cryptographic Key Destruction

	FCS_COP.1(a)		Cryptographic Operation					
	FCS_COP.1(a)		Cryptographic Operation

	FCS_COP.1(b)		Cryptographic Operation					
	FCS_COP.1(b)		Cryptographic Operation

	FCS_COP.1(d)		Cryptographic Operation					
	FCS_COP.1(d)		Cryptographic Operation

	FCS_COP.1(e)		Cryptographic Operation					
	FCS_COP.1(e)		Cryptographic Operation

	FCS_CKM.1(b)		Cryptographic Key Generation			
	FCS_CKM.1(b)		Cryptographic Key Generation

	FDP_ACC.2		Complete Access Control			
	FDP_ACC.2		Complete Access Control

	FDP_ACF.1		Security Attribute Based Access Control			
	FDP_ACF.1		Security Attribute Based Access Control

	FDP_IFC.2(a)		Complete Information Flow Control					
	FDP_IFC.2(a)		Complete Information Flow Control

	FDP_IFC.2(b)		Complete Information Flow Control					
	FDP_IFC.2(b)		Complete Information Flow Control

	FDP_IFF.1(a)		Simple Security Attributes					
	FDP_IFF.1(a)		Simple Security Attributes

	FDP_IFF.1(b)		Simple Security Attributes					
	FDP_IFF.1(b)		Simple Security Attributes

	FDP_UCT.1		Basic Data Exchange Confidentiality			
	FDP_UCT.1		Basic Data Exchange Confidentiality

	FDP_UIT.1		Data Exchange Integrity			
	FDP_UIT.1		Data Exchange Integrity

	FIA_UAU.1		Timing of Authentication			
	FIA_UAU.1		Timing of Authentication

	FIA_UAU.5		Multiple Authentication Mechanisms			
	FIA_UAU.5		Multiple Authentication Mechanisms

	FIA_UID.2		User Identification Before any Action

	FMT_MOF.1(a)		Management of Security Functions Behavior					
	FMT_MOF.1(a)		Management of Security Functions Behavior

	FMT_MOF.1(b)		Management of Security Functions Behavior					
	FMT_MOF.1(b)		Management of Security Functions Behavior

	FMT_MSA.1(a)		Management of Security Attributes					
	FMT_MSA.1(a)		Management of Security Attributes


Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11									Page 20 of 67
			© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual IT Security Requirements, TOE Security Functional Requirements

Contents

Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4+ Document Version Prepared forPrepared by Nortel NetworksRevision History VersionModification Date Modified ByTable of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTSTOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION REVISION HISTORYTable of Figures Table of TablesPROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS RATIONALE1 Security Target Introduction 1.1 Purpose1.2 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance Table 1 - ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance1.3 Conventions, Acronyms, and Terminology 1.3.1 Conventions1.3.2 Terminology Table 2 - TerminologyPage 7 of Primary Admin passwordView Nortel VPN Router rights Figure 1 - VPN Client Deployment Configuration of the TOE 2 TOE Description2.1 Product Type 2.2 Product DescriptionFigure 2 - Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Figure 4 - Physical TOE Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode 2.3 TOE Boundaries and Scope2.3.1 Physical Boundary Figure 3 - Physical TOE Boundary2.3.2 Logical Boundary 2.3.1.1 TOE EnvironmentNortel VPN Switch Software VxWorks OS Contivity Hardware Appliance Figure 6 - TOE Logical Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel ModeThe World Software2.3.2.3 User Data Protection 2.3.2.1 Security Audit2.3.2.2 Cryptographic Support 2.3.2.4 Identification and Authentication 2.3.2.5 Security Management2.3.2.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions 2.3.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels2.3.3 Excluded TOE Functionality 3.2 Threats to Security 3 TOE Security Environment3.1 Assumptions 3.2.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE 3.2.2 Threats Addressed by the TOE EnvironmentT.HACK TE.PHYSICAL4 Security Objectives 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives 4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment4.2.1 IT Security Objectives Table 3 - TOE Security Functional Requirements 5 IT Security Requirements5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements Page 21 of 5.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit FAUGEN.1 Audit Data GenerationFAUSAR.1 Audit review Table 4 - Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation Page 23 of5.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support FCSCKM.1aCryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman FCSCKM.1bCryptographic operation authentication FCSCOP.1bFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generationFDPITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCSCKM.1 Cryptographic key generationFCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMTMSA.2 Secure security attributesFDPACC.2 Complete access control FDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control5.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPNFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall Page 30 of FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity 5.1.4 Class FIA Identification and Authentication FIAUAU.1 Timing of authenticationFIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionPage 32 of 5.1.5 Class FMT Security Management FMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviourFMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.1c Management of security attributes FMTMSA.2 Secure security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation Page 34 ofFMTSMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisationFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesThe TSF shall be able to associate users with roles Page 36 ofFPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testing FPTTST.1 TSF testing5.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the TSF FPTRPL.1 Replay detection5.1.7 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels FTPTRP.1 Trusted path5.2 Security Functional Requirements on the IT Environment FPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSPFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsPage 40 of 5.3 Assurance Requirements Table 6 - Assurance Components6 TOE Summary Specification 6.1 TOE Security Functions6.1.1 Security Audit Configuration LogAccounting Logs Security LogTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FAUGEN.1, FAUSAR.1 System LogEvent Log Table 9 - FIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms 6.1.2 Cryptographic SupportTable 8 - FIPS Validated Modules 6.1.3 User Data Protection Page 46 of6.1.4 Identification and Authentication 6.1.5 Security Management6.1.6.2 Conditional Self-Tests 6.1.6.1 Power-Up Self-Tests6.1.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions 6.2 TOE Security Assurance Measures 6.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels8 Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Page 50 of7 Protection Profile Claims 7.1 Protection Profile ReferenceTable 11 - Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives 8 Rationale8.1 Security Objectives Rationale T.HACK Page 54 of Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation2008 Nortel Networks 8.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale Page 55 ofRequirements Table 12 - Relationship of Security Requirements to ObjectivesObjectives  The Primary Admin access to all the administrative functions that are used to enforce the SFP FMTMSA.3a,b,c O.REPLAY 8.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale 8.4 Rationale for Strength of Function8.5 Dependency Rationale Table 13 - Functional Requirements Dependencies9 Met by hierarchical SFR FDPACC.2 Met by hierarchical SFR FDPIFC.2Met by hierarchical SFR FIAUID.2 SFR IDFDPUCT.1 8.6 TOE Summary Specification RationaleFCSCOP.1 8.6.2.3 Development 8.6.2.1 Configuration Management8.6.2.2 Secure Delivery and Operation 8.6.2.4 Guidance Documentation 8.6.2.5 Life Cycle Support Documents8.6.2.6 Tests Page 64 of8.7 Strength of Function 8.6.2.7 Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses9 Acronyms Table 15 - AcronymsPage 67 of