Logical Boundary, TOE Environment | Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05

Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

In Figure 3 above, the TOE is installed at the boundary of the private (“Enterprise”) network and the public (“Internet”) network. In Figure 4 above, the TOE is installed at the boundary of the two private (“Enterprise”) networks. The essential physical components of the TOE are:

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 build 100: The Nortel VPN Router is a dedicated hardware/software appliance running a Nortel-hardened version of the VxWorks OS. All non-essential OS processes have been removed and direct access to the OS is impossible. The Nortel VPN Router is produced at seven performance levels (models 600, 1010, 1050, 1100, 1750, 2750, and 5000) which provide identical functionality; they differ only in network throughput and performance.

Nortel VPN Client Workstation v7.11 build 100: The Nortel VPN Client is used to access to establish VPN sessions with the Nortel VPN Router from a remote location.

2.3.1.1TOE Environment

The TOE environment is composed of the following:

Nortel VPN Client Workstation2

oProvides the underlying OS (Microsoft Windows 2000 SP4 or XP SP2) and general-purpose computing hardware platform for the VPN user to connect to the Nortel VPN Router.

Management Workstation

oProvides the underlying OS and general-purpose computing hardware platform for the TOE user to interact with the administrative GUI provided by the TOE.

CLI Workstation

oProvides the underlying OS and general-purpose computing hardware platform for the TOE user to interact with the administrative CLI provided by the TOE.

Corporate Servers

oProvide data and services to VPN users through the VPN services provided by the TOE.

2.3.2Logical Boundary

Figure 5 and Figure 6 below illustrates the logical boundary of this CC evaluation:

2 Note that the Nortel VPN Client Software is included within the TOE boundary but the underlying OS and hardware are not.

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11	Page 11 of 67
© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 manual Logical Boundary, TOE Environment

Contents

Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Revision History Table of Contents Rationale Table of FiguresTable of Tables Protection Profile Claims ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance Security Target IntroductionPurpose Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance Terminology Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyConventions Terminology Primary Admin password Product Description TOE DescriptionProduct Type Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Physical Boundary TOE Boundaries and Scope TOE Environment Logical Boundary Enterprise World User Data Protection Security AuditCryptographic Support Trusted Path/Channels Identification and AuthenticationSecurity Management Protection of the TOE Security Functions Excluded TOE Functionality Threats to Security TOE Security EnvironmentAssumptions Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Threats Addressed by the TOE Security Objectives for the TOE Security Objectives OE.TIME Security Objectives for the EnvironmentIT Security Objectives Non-IT Security Objectives ST Operation IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements TOE Security Functional Requirements Description ST Operation Auditable Events Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation FAUSAR.1 Audit review Dependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman FCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA FCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation Security Target, Version March 18 FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPN FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control Class FDP User Data Protection FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1.1 FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1.1 FIAUID.2 User identification before any action Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms Dependencies No dependencies FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributes Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.2.1 FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security roles FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1.2 FPTRPL.1 Replay detection FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing Class FPT Protection of the TSF FTPTRP.1.2 Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1 Trusted path FTPTRP.1.1 FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stamps Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation Security Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Requirements Assurance RequirementsAssurance Components Description Function TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Functions TOE Security Security Log Configuration LogSecurity Audit Accounting Logs Event Log System Log Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate # Cryptographic SupportFips Validated Modules FIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms User Data Protection Security Management Identification and Authentication Conditional Self-Tests Power-Up Self-TestsProtection of the TOE Security Functions Assurance Assurance Measure Component TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTrusted Path/Channels TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Reference Protection Profile Claims TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-IT RationaleSecurity Objectives Rationale Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives Hack Certificate OE.CERTIFICATE Security Functional Requirements Rationale Objectives Requirements Relationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Env Functions and data FMTMSA.3a,b,c Able to access such functionality Integrity Reject packets based on their attributes Functional Requirements Dependencies Security Assurance Requirements RationaleRationale for Strength of Function Dependency Rationale FCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Development Configuration ManagementSecure Delivery and Operation Tests Guidance DocumentationLife Cycle Support Documents Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Strength of Function DoD AcronymsAcronyms Acronym Definition SHA