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Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 FDPITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or, Page 26 of

Models: 7.11 7.05

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Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or

FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11	Page 26 of 67
© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Nortel Networks 7.05 FDPITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or, FCSCKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

Contents

Prepared by Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4+ Document VersionPrepared for Nortel NetworksModification Date Revision HistoryVersion Modified ByTOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION Table of ContentsTABLE OF CONTENTS REVISION HISTORYPROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS Table of FiguresTable of Tables RATIONALE1.2 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance 1 Security Target Introduction1.1 Purpose Table 1 - ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance1.3.2 Terminology 1.3 Conventions, Acronyms, and Terminology1.3.1 Conventions Table 2 - TerminologyPage 7 of Primary Admin passwordView Nortel VPN Router rights 2.1 Product Type Figure 1 - VPN Client Deployment Configuration of the TOE2 TOE Description 2.2 Product DescriptionFigure 2 - Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE 2.3.1 Physical Boundary Figure 4 - Physical TOE Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode2.3 TOE Boundaries and Scope Figure 3 - Physical TOE Boundary2.3.2 Logical Boundary 2.3.1.1 TOE EnvironmentThe World Nortel VPN Switch Software VxWorks OS Contivity Hardware ApplianceFigure 6 - TOE Logical Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode Software2.3.2.3 User Data Protection 2.3.2.1 Security Audit2.3.2.2 Cryptographic Support 2.3.2.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions 2.3.2.4 Identification and Authentication2.3.2.5 Security Management 2.3.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels2.3.3 Excluded TOE Functionality 3.2 Threats to Security 3 TOE Security Environment3.1 Assumptions T.HACK 3.2.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE3.2.2 Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment TE.PHYSICAL4 Security Objectives 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives 4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment4.2.1 IT Security Objectives Table 3 - TOE Security Functional Requirements 5 IT Security Requirements5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements Page 21 of FAUSAR.1 Audit review 5.1.1 Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Table 4 - Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation Page 23 ofCryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman 5.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a FCSCKM.1bFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation random number generationFCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FDPITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, orFCSCKM.1 Cryptographic key generation FMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes5.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPNFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall Page 30 of FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms 5.1.4 Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionPage 32 of FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour 5.1.5 Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes Page 34 ofFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesThe TSF shall be able to associate users with roles Page 36 of5.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the TSF FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTRPL.1 Replay detection5.1.7 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels FTPTRP.1 Trusted pathFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation 5.2 Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsPage 40 of 5.3 Assurance Requirements Table 6 - Assurance Components6 TOE Summary Specification 6.1 TOE Security FunctionsAccounting Logs 6.1.1 Security AuditConfiguration Log Security LogTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FAUGEN.1, FAUSAR.1 System LogEvent Log Table 9 - FIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms 6.1.2 Cryptographic SupportTable 8 - FIPS Validated Modules 6.1.3 User Data Protection Page 46 of6.1.4 Identification and Authentication 6.1.5 Security Management6.1.6.2 Conditional Self-Tests 6.1.6.1 Power-Up Self-Tests6.1.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions 6.2 TOE Security Assurance Measures 6.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels8 Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Page 50 of7 Protection Profile Claims 7.1 Protection Profile ReferenceTable 11 - Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives 8 Rationale8.1 Security Objectives Rationale T.HACK Page 54 of Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation2008 Nortel Networks 8.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale Page 55 ofRequirements Table 12 - Relationship of Security Requirements to ObjectivesObjectives  The Primary Admin access to all the administrative functions that are used to enforce the SFP FMTMSA.3a,b,c O.REPLAY 8.5 Dependency Rationale 8.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale8.4 Rationale for Strength of Function Table 13 - Functional Requirements DependenciesMet by hierarchical SFR FIAUID.2 9 Met by hierarchical SFR FDPACC.2Met by hierarchical SFR FDPIFC.2 SFR IDFDPUCT.1 8.6 TOE Summary Specification RationaleFCSCOP.1 8.6.2.3 Development 8.6.2.1 Configuration Management8.6.2.2 Secure Delivery and Operation 8.6.2.6 Tests 8.6.2.4 Guidance Documentation8.6.2.5 Life Cycle Support Documents Page 64 of8.7 Strength of Function 8.6.2.7 Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses9 Acronyms Table 15 - AcronymsPage 67 of

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