Class FAU Security Audit, Auditable Events | Nortel Networks 7.05

Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

5.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit

FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FAU_GEN.1.1

The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

a)Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;

b)All auditable events, for the [not specified] level of audit; and

c)[All events listed in Table 4].

Table 4 - Auditable Events

Event

Start-up and shutdown of audit functions

Modification to the TSF and System data

Reading of information from the audit Records

All modifications to the audit configuration that occur while the audit collection functions are operating

All use of the user identification and authentication mechanism

All modifications in the behavior of the Functions of the TSF

Modifications to the role allocation of users

FAU_GEN.1.2

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

a)Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and

b)For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [no other audit relevant information].

Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FAU_SAR.1.1

The TSF shall provide [Primary Admin, the Restricted Admin, and the VPN User] with the capability to read [all audit records that they have permission to view] from the audit records.

FAU_SAR.1.2

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Nortel Networks 7.05 Class FAU Security Audit, FAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation, FAUSAR.1 Audit review, Auditable Events

Contents

Nortel Networks Corsec Security, Inc Revision History Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes Table of Contents Protection Profile Claims Table of FiguresTable of Tables Rationale Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance Security Target IntroductionPurpose ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance Terminology Conventions, Acronyms, and TerminologyConventions Terminology Primary Admin password Product Type TOE DescriptionProduct Description Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE TOE Boundaries and Scope Physical Boundary Logical Boundary TOE Environment World Enterprise Cryptographic Support Security AuditUser Data Protection Protection of the TOE Security Functions Identification and AuthenticationSecurity Management Trusted Path/Channels Excluded TOE Functionality Assumptions TOE Security EnvironmentThreats to Security Threats Addressed by the TOE Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment Security Objectives Security Objectives for the TOE Non-IT Security Objectives Security Objectives for the EnvironmentIT Security Objectives OE.TIME TOE Security Functional Requirements IT Security RequirementsTOE Security Functional Requirements ST Operation Description ST Operation FAUSAR.1 Audit review Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Auditable Events Dependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation FCSCKM.1b Cryptographic key generation RSA Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation random number generation FCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1e Cryptographic operation hashing Security Target, Version March 18 Class FDP User Data Protection FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUCT.1.1 FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityFDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUIT.1.1 FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUID.2 User identification before any action Dependencies No dependencies FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributes FMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.2.1 FMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security roles FMTSMR.1.2 Class FPT Protection of the TSF FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTRPL.1 Replay detection FTPTRP.1.1 Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFTPTRP.1 Trusted path FTPTRP.1.2 FPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stamps Security Target, Version 3.9March 18 Assurance Components Assurance RequirementsAssurance Requirements TOE Security TOE Summary SpecificationTOE Security Functions Description Function Accounting Logs Configuration LogSecurity Audit Security Log System Log Event Log FIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Cryptographic SupportFips Validated Modules Validation Modules Fips 140-2 Certificate # User Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security Management Protection of the TOE Security Functions Power-Up Self-TestsConditional Self-Tests TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FTPTRP.1 TOE Security Assurance MeasuresTrusted Path/Channels Assurance Assurance Measure Component Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Protection Profile Claims Protection Profile Reference Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives RationaleSecurity Objectives Rationale TOE Objectives Environmental Objectives Non-IT Hack Certificate Security Functional Requirements Rationale OE.CERTIFICATE Relationship of Security Requirements to Objectives Objectives Requirements Functions and data Env Able to access such functionality FMTMSA.3a,b,c Reject packets based on their attributes Integrity Dependency Rationale Security Assurance Requirements RationaleRationale for Strength of Function Functional Requirements Dependencies FCSCOP.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale Secure Delivery and Operation Configuration ManagementDevelopment Life Cycle Support Documents Guidance DocumentationTests Strength of Function Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses Acronym Definition AcronymsAcronyms DoD SHA