Security Target, Version 3.9 | March 18, 2008 |
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8 Rationale
This section provides the rationale for the selection of the security requirements, objectives, assumptions, and threats. In particular, it shows that the security requirements are suitable to meet the security objectives, which in turn are shown to be suitable to cover all aspects of the TOE security environment.
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each assumption, threat, and policy statement that compose the Security Target. Table 11 demonstrates the mapping between the assumptions, threats, and polices to the security objectives is complete. The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each assumption, threat, and policy.
Table 11 - Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives
O.I&A
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| Environmental Objectives |
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| IT |
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O.AUDIT | O.SELFPROTECT |
| O.CONFIDENT | O.INTEGRITY | O.FILTER | O.FUNCTIONS |
| O.ADMIN | O.TEST | O.REPLAY |
| OE.TIME | OE.CERTIFICATE |
| OE.DOMSEP |
| OE.TRAINED |
| OE.DELIVERY |
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| T.UNDETECT |
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| TOE |
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| Threats |
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| T.HACK |
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| TOE | Environment |
| TE.PHYSICAL |
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| TE.AUDIT_FAILURE |
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| TE.BAD_CERT |
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| Assumptions |
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| A.TIMESTAMPS |
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| A.PHYSICAL |
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| A.CERTIFICATE |
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| A.INSTALL |
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| A.ACCESS |
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| A.DOMSEP |
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T.UNDETECT An attacker may gain undetected access due to missing, weak, and/or incorrectly implemented access controls for the restricted files or TSF Data in order to cause violations of integrity, confidentiality, or availability of the information protected by and flowing through the TOE.
The TOE identifies and authenticates users prior to allowing access to TOE functions and data (O.I&A). The TOE records audit records for data accesses and use of the System functions (O.AUDIT). The TOE provides functionality that enables only authorized user to establish VPN sessions with the TOE using IPSec protocol (O.FUNCTIONS). The TOE provides functionality that enables testing of its correct functioning and integrity (O.TEST).
O.I&A, O.AUDIT, O.FUNCTIONS, and O.TEST combined ensure that this threat is removed.
Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11 | Page 52 of 67 |
© 2008 Nortel Networks |
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