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Nortel Networks 7.11, 7.05 manual Page 67 of

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Security Target, Version 3.9			March 18, 2008


	Acronym	Definition

	SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
	SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
	SOF	Strength of Function
	SOF	Strength of Function
	ST	Security Target
	ST	Security Target
	TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
	TCP	Transmission Control Protocol

	TOE	Target of Evaluation
	TOE	Target of Evaluation
	TSF	TOE Security Function
	TSF	TOE Security Function
	TSP	TOE Security Policy
	TSP	TOE Security Policy
	UDP	User Datagram Protocol
	UDP	User Datagram Protocol
	VPN	Virtual Private Network
	VPN	Virtual Private Network
	WAN	Wide Area Network
	WAN	Wide Area Network

Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11	Page 67 of 67
© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Contents

Nortel Networks Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4+ Document VersionPrepared for Prepared byModified By Revision HistoryVersion Modification DateREVISION HISTORY Table of ContentsTABLE OF CONTENTS TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATIONRATIONALE Table of FiguresTable of Tables PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMSTable 1 - ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance 1 Security Target Introduction1.1 Purpose 1.2 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and ConformanceTable 2 - Terminology 1.3 Conventions, Acronyms, and Terminology1.3.1 Conventions 1.3.2 TerminologyView Nortel VPN Router rights Primary Admin passwordPage 7 of 2.2 Product Description Figure 1 - VPN Client Deployment Configuration of the TOE2 TOE Description 2.1 Product TypeFigure 2 - Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE Figure 3 - Physical TOE Boundary Figure 4 - Physical TOE Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode2.3 TOE Boundaries and Scope 2.3.1 Physical Boundary2.3.1.1 TOE Environment 2.3.2 Logical BoundarySoftware Nortel VPN Switch Software VxWorks OS Contivity Hardware ApplianceFigure 6 - TOE Logical Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode The World2.3.2.2 Cryptographic Support 2.3.2.1 Security Audit2.3.2.3 User Data Protection 2.3.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels 2.3.2.4 Identification and Authentication2.3.2.5 Security Management 2.3.2.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions2.3.3 Excluded TOE Functionality 3.1 Assumptions 3 TOE Security Environment3.2 Threats to Security TE.PHYSICAL 3.2.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE3.2.2 Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment T.HACK4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE 4 Security Objectives4.2.1 IT Security Objectives 4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements 5 IT Security RequirementsTable 3 - TOE Security Functional Requirements Page 21 of Table 4 - Auditable Events 5.1.1 Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation FAUSAR.1 Audit reviewPage 23 of Dependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generationFCSCKM.1b 5.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a Cryptographic key generation Diffie-HellmanCryptographic operation random number generation Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1b FCSCOP.1dFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FDPITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, orFCSCKM.1 Cryptographic key generation FCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPN FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control 5.1.3 Class FDP User Data ProtectionFDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPN FDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control FirewallFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrity FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentialityPage 30 of FIAUID.2 User identification before any action 5.1.4 Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanismsPage 32 of FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributes 5.1.5 Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviourPage 34 of FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes FMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisationFMTSMR.1 Security roles FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisationPage 36 of The TSF shall be able to associate users with rolesFPTRPL.1 Replay detection FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing 5.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the TSFFTPTRP.1 Trusted path 5.1.7 Class FTP Trusted Path/ChannelsFPTSTM.1 Reliable time stamps 5.2 Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSEP.1 TSF domain separationPage 40 of Table 6 - Assurance Components 5.3 Assurance Requirements6.1 TOE Security Functions 6 TOE Summary SpecificationSecurity Log 6.1.1 Security AuditConfiguration Log Accounting LogsEvent Log System LogTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FAUGEN.1, FAUSAR.1 Table 8 - FIPS Validated Modules 6.1.2 Cryptographic SupportTable 9 - FIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms Page 46 of 6.1.3 User Data Protection6.1.5 Security Management 6.1.4 Identification and Authentication6.1.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions 6.1.6.1 Power-Up Self-Tests6.1.6.2 Conditional Self-Tests 6.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels 6.2 TOE Security Assurance MeasuresPage 50 of 8 Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level7.1 Protection Profile Reference 7 Protection Profile Claims8.1 Security Objectives Rationale 8 RationaleTable 11 - Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives T.HACK 2008 Nortel Networks Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client WorkstationPage 54 of Page 55 of 8.2 Security Functional Requirements RationaleObjectives Table 12 - Relationship of Security Requirements to ObjectivesRequirements  The Primary Admin access to all the administrative functions that are used to enforce the SFP FMTMSA.3a,b,c O.REPLAY Table 13 - Functional Requirements Dependencies 8.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale8.4 Rationale for Strength of Function 8.5 Dependency RationaleSFR ID 9 Met by hierarchical SFR FDPACC.2Met by hierarchical SFR FDPIFC.2 Met by hierarchical SFR FIAUID.2FCSCOP.1 8.6 TOE Summary Specification RationaleFDPUCT.1 8.6.2.2 Secure Delivery and Operation 8.6.2.1 Configuration Management8.6.2.3 Development Page 64 of 8.6.2.4 Guidance Documentation8.6.2.5 Life Cycle Support Documents 8.6.2.6 Tests8.6.2.7 Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses 8.7 Strength of FunctionTable 15 - Acronyms 9 AcronymsPage 67 of

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