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Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual TOE Summary Specification, TOE Security Functions

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Security Target, Version 3.9	March 18, 2008

6 TOE Summary Specification

This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional and assurance requirements described in previous sections of this ST.

6.1 TOE Security Functions

Each of the security function descriptions is organized by the security requirements corresponding to the security function. Hence, each function is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related requirements. This serves to both describe the security functions and rationalize that the security functions are suitable to satisfy the necessary requirements.

Table 7 - Mapping of TOE Security Functions to Security Functional Requirements


	TOE Security
	TOE Security		SFR ID		Description
	Function		SFR ID		Description
	Function

	Security Audit		FAU_GEN.1		Audit Data Generation

			FAU_SAR.1		Audit Review

	Cryptographic Support		FCS_CKM.1(a)		Cryptographic Key Generation

			FCS_CKM.1(b)		Cryptographic Key Generation

			FCS_CKM.4		Cryptographic Key Destruction

			FCS_COP.1(a)		Cryptographic Operation

			FCS_COP.1(b)		Cryptographic Operation

			FCS_COP.1(d)		Cryptographic Operation

			FCS_COP.1(e)		Cryptographic Operation

	User Data Protection		FDP_ACC.2		Complete Access Control

			FDP_ACF.1		Security Attribute Based Access Control

			FDP_IFC.2(a)		Complete Information Flow Control

			FDP_IFC.2(b)		Complete Information Flow Control

			FDP_IFF.1(a)		Simple Security Attributes

			FDP_IFF.1(b)		Simple Security Attributes

			FDP_UCT.1		Basic Data Exchange Confidentiality

			FDP_UIT.1		Data Exchange Integrity

	Identification and		FIA_UAU.1		Timing of Authentication
	Authentication
	Authentication		FIA_UAU.5		Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
			FIA_UAU.5		Multiple Authentication Mechanisms

			FIA_UID.2		User Identification Before any Action

	Security Management		FMT_MOF.1(a)		Management of Security Functions Behavior

			FMT_MOF.1(b)		Management of Security Functions Behavior

			FMT_MSA.1(a)		Management of Security Attributes

			FMT_MSA.1(b)		Management of Security Attributes

			FMT_MSA.1(c)		Management of Security Attributes

			FMT_MSA.2		Secure Security Attributes

			FMT_MSA.3(a)		Static Attribute Initialization


Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11					Page 42 of 67

© 2008 Nortel Networks

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Nortel Networks 7.05, 7.11 manual TOE Summary Specification, TOE Security Functions

Contents

Prepared by Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4+ Document VersionPrepared for Nortel NetworksModification Date Revision HistoryVersion Modified ByTOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION Table of ContentsTABLE OF CONTENTS REVISION HISTORYPROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS Table of FiguresTable of Tables RATIONALE1.2 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance 1 Security Target Introduction1.1 Purpose Table 1 - ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance1.3.2 Terminology 1.3 Conventions, Acronyms, and Terminology1.3.1 Conventions Table 2 - TerminologyPrimary Admin password View Nortel VPN Router rightsPage 7 of 2.1 Product Type Figure 1 - VPN Client Deployment Configuration of the TOE2 TOE Description 2.2 Product DescriptionFigure 2 - Branch Office Deployment Configuration of the TOE 2.3.1 Physical Boundary Figure 4 - Physical TOE Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode2.3 TOE Boundaries and Scope Figure 3 - Physical TOE Boundary2.3.2 Logical Boundary 2.3.1.1 TOE EnvironmentThe World Nortel VPN Switch Software VxWorks OS Contivity Hardware ApplianceFigure 6 - TOE Logical Boundary in Branch Office Tunnel Mode Software2.3.2.1 Security Audit 2.3.2.2 Cryptographic Support2.3.2.3 User Data Protection 2.3.2.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions 2.3.2.4 Identification and Authentication2.3.2.5 Security Management 2.3.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels2.3.3 Excluded TOE Functionality 3 TOE Security Environment 3.1 Assumptions3.2 Threats to Security T.HACK 3.2.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE3.2.2 Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment TE.PHYSICAL4 Security Objectives 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment 4.2.1 IT Security Objectives4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives 5 IT Security Requirements 5.1 TOE Security Functional RequirementsTable 3 - TOE Security Functional Requirements Page 21 of FAUSAR.1 Audit review 5.1.1 Class FAU Security AuditFAUGEN.1 Audit Data Generation Table 4 - Auditable EventsDependencies FAUGEN.1 Audit data generation Page 23 ofCryptographic key generation Diffie-Hellman 5.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic SupportFCSCKM.1a FCSCKM.1bFCSCOP.1d Cryptographic operation authenticationFCSCOP.1b Cryptographic operation random number generationFCSCKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FDPITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, orFCSCKM.1 Cryptographic key generation FMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes5.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection FDPACC.2 Complete access controlFDPACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDPIFC.2a Complete information flow control VPNFDPIFC.2b Complete information flow control Firewall FDPIFF.1a Simple security attributes VPNFDPIFF.1b Simple security attributes Firewall FDPUCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality FDPUIT.1 Data exchange integrityPage 30 of FIAUAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms 5.1.4 Class FIA Identification and AuthenticationFIAUAU.1 Timing of authentication FIAUID.2 User identification before any actionPage 32 of FMTMOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour 5.1.5 Class FMT Security ManagementFMTMOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour FMTMSA.1a Management of security attributesFMTMSA.3a Static attribute initialisation FMTMSA.1c Management of security attributesFMTMSA.2 Secure security attributes Page 34 ofFMTMSA.3c Static attribute initialisation FMTSMF.1 Specification of Management FunctionsFMTMSA.3b Static attribute initialisation FMTSMR.1 Security rolesThe TSF shall be able to associate users with roles Page 36 of5.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the TSF FPTAMT.1 Abstract machine testingFPTTST.1 TSF testing FPTRPL.1 Replay detection5.1.7 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels FTPTRP.1 Trusted pathFPTSEP.1 TSF domain separation 5.2 Security Functional Requirements on the IT EnvironmentFPTRVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPTSTM.1 Reliable time stampsPage 40 of 5.3 Assurance Requirements Table 6 - Assurance Components6 TOE Summary Specification 6.1 TOE Security FunctionsAccounting Logs 6.1.1 Security AuditConfiguration Log Security LogSystem Log Event LogTOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied FAUGEN.1, FAUSAR.1 6.1.2 Cryptographic Support Table 8 - FIPS Validated ModulesTable 9 - FIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms 6.1.3 User Data Protection Page 46 of6.1.4 Identification and Authentication 6.1.5 Security Management6.1.6.1 Power-Up Self-Tests 6.1.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions6.1.6.2 Conditional Self-Tests 6.2 TOE Security Assurance Measures 6.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels8 Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level Page 50 of7 Protection Profile Claims 7.1 Protection Profile Reference8 Rationale 8.1 Security Objectives RationaleTable 11 - Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives T.HACK Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation 2008 Nortel NetworksPage 54 of 8.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale Page 55 ofTable 12 - Relationship of Security Requirements to Objectives ObjectivesRequirements  The Primary Admin access to all the administrative functions that are used to enforce the SFP FMTMSA.3a,b,c O.REPLAY 8.5 Dependency Rationale 8.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale8.4 Rationale for Strength of Function Table 13 - Functional Requirements DependenciesMet by hierarchical SFR FIAUID.2 9 Met by hierarchical SFR FDPACC.2Met by hierarchical SFR FDPIFC.2 SFR ID8.6 TOE Summary Specification Rationale FCSCOP.1FDPUCT.1 8.6.2.1 Configuration Management 8.6.2.2 Secure Delivery and Operation8.6.2.3 Development 8.6.2.6 Tests 8.6.2.4 Guidance Documentation8.6.2.5 Life Cycle Support Documents Page 64 of8.7 Strength of Function 8.6.2.7 Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses9 Acronyms Table 15 - AcronymsPage 67 of