Microsoft Close Combat manual Scale of Forces, Germans advancing into Russia

Chapter 7 The Big Picture: A Short History of World War II 131

German Panzer armies. Still, the Red Army has a two-to-one advantage in tanks, including the superior T-34 and KV1 models. The Soviets also enjoy a nearly three-to-one advantage in aircraft, but German air strikes knock out communications and destroy many Soviet aircraft on the ground. In the first seven hours, the Soviets lose over 1,000 aircraft and the Germans quickly establish air supremacy over the battlefields. This supremacy cripples Soviet efforts to move men and materiel to meet the German offensive. Perhaps more importantly, Stalin’s purges of the late 1930s have stripped away many experienced Soviet com- manders; in their place are political generals with little or no experience. This lack of experienced commanders plagued the Red Army in Finland, and it will plague them again at the start of Barbarossa.

Scale of Forces

The scale of the fighting between the Soviet Union and Germany dwarfs the Normandy Campaign. The Allied forces amassed for the Normandy Campaign number approximately 1,500,000 men; by June 12, 1944 over 325,000 men are ashore.

In contrast, over 3,000,000 men are assembled for Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, along with 7,100 guns, 3,300 tanks, and 625,000 horses. The Soviets gather over 500,000 men for their counterattack at Stalingrad. At the Battle of Kursk, the Soviets and Germans together concentrate over 2,000,000 men and 6,000 tanks.

At 0300 hours on June 22, Germany looses its blitzkrieg on the Soviet Union. The Soviets are taken by surprise. Some German units advance 40 miles the first day. In a week General Guderian’s Second Panzer Group pushes nearly 300 miles and traps the Soviet Third and Tenth Armies. The story is much the same all along the front: Rapid German advances trap many Red Army units, and wholesale surren- ders begin. By July 9, more than 40 Red Army divisions are out of action, and 300,000 Soviet soldiers are captured. On July 12, the Germans bomb Moscow for the first time. It appears that Hitler’s dream of conquering Russia may become a reality.

Then in late August, Hitler makes his first mistake of the campaign. He orders Guderian’s Second Panzer Group and the Second Army to link up with Army Group South. Most gener- als disagree with the orders they believe the drive to Moscow should continue rolling because the rapid capture of Moscow is one of the keys to the success of Barbarossa. In the short term, the move is a success; within three weeks the linkup is complete and another 600,000 Soviet troops are encircled. But the drive toward Moscow slows.

Germans advancing into Russia